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John H. Munro 
South German Silver, European Textiles, and Venetian Trade  
with the Levant and Ottoman Empire, c. 1370 to c. 1720:  
A Non-mercantilist Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem 
A recurrent and indeed persistent problem in European economic history 
-- a veritable deus ex machina -- from medieval to modern times – is Europe’s 
supposed ‘balance of  payments’ problem in trade with the ‘East’, especially 
with the Islamic ‘East’. The nature of  the problem has strongly Mercantilist 
overtones to it: i.e., the Mercantilist view that precious metals – gold and sil-
ver – are not just mediums of  exchange but wealth (store of  value), the most 
tangible form of  wealth, and the key to gaining and maintaining national 
power. So often, in the historical literature, precious metal exports have been 
viewed as a serious drainage of  Europe’s veritable life-blood. That very view-
point has influenced, indeed pervaded, the way in which many historians have 
interpreted much of  European economic history, from medieval to early-
modern times. 
The best example is the current literature on the debate about the sup-
posed late-medieval ‘great depression’. For such notable economic historians 
as Robert Lopez, Harry Miskimin, John Day, and Peter Spufford have argued 
that the economic contraction and, in their view, veritable ‘economic depres-
sion’ in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was either caused or cer-
tainly greatly exacerbated by a supposedly increased outflow of  precious 
metals to the ‘East’.1 Miskimin is particularly ingenious in arguing that, al-
                                                     
1 H. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market Structures: Forces for Contraction in 14th and 
15th Century England, in “Journal of  Economic History”, 24, 1964, pp. 470-490; reprinted in 
IDEM, Cash, Credit, and Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600, London 1989 (Variorum Reprints), no. VII; 
IDEM, The Economy of  Early Renaissance Europe, 1300-1460, 1969; reissued Cambridge 1976, pp. 
25-32, 132-150; R. LOPEZ, H. MISKIMIN, The Economic Depression of  the Renaissance, in “Economic 
History Review”, 2nd ser., 14, 1962, pp. 408-426; R.S. LOPEZ, H.A. MISKIMIN, A.L. UDOVITCH, 
England to Egypt, 1350-1500: Long-Term Trends and Long-Distance Trade, in Studies in the Economic 
History of  the Middle East, ed. M.A. COOK, London 1970, pp. 93-128; J. DAY, The Great Bullion 
Famine of  the Fifteenth Century, in “Past and Present”, 79, May 1978, pp. 1-54; reprinted in IDEM, 
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though the ‘depression’ commenced with falling population, especially after 
the Black Death, the economic consequences, with changes in relative prices, 
then led to a net outflow of  precious metals from northern Europe to Italy, 
whose Mediterranean trade then led to the outflow of  an even greater stock of  
precious metals to the Levant, and ultimately to Asia (though, in his view, that 
net ‘outflow’ also involved European trade with the eastern Baltic and Russia).  
As a supposed monetarist who deals with these very problems, I believe 
that such a thesis concerning bullion outflows, in financing deficits in 
Europe’s balance of  payments with the ‘East’, gives ‘monetarism’ a bad name. 
That may be surprising to some, for I have certainly published a great deal on 
late-medieval monetary problems, particularly on the related debate concern-
ing the so-called ‘bullion famines’. I must, therefore, re-assert my major con-
clusions. Late-medieval Europe did experience some periodic scarcities of  
coined money — i.e. , when the circulating coined money supply was scarce 
relative to the transactions demand for money – especially during these three 
periods, which were also distinctly deflationary periods: ca. 1320-ca.1340, ca. 
1370-ca. 1420, and ca. 1440-ca. 1470. 
 
The nature and problems of  monetary scarcity and deflation in late-medieval Europe 
I found, however, no compelling evidence that such periodic monetary 
scarcities were due to any pronounced increase in the outflow of  bullion in 
European trade and payments balances with the ‘East’. Even if  the least-
squares regression trend line of  the value of  aggregate mint outputs in both 
England and the Low Countries is steeply downward (and with almost identi-
cal ‘b’ co-efficients), as would be fully expected with a continuous decline in 
population, to about 1520, the variations from the trend line do not seem 
consistent with a thesis of  worsening deficit in Europe’s balance of  payments 
(i.e., with the ‘East’).2 In sum, no one has yet proven that the European econ-
                                                                                                                         
The Medieval Market Economy, Oxford 1987 (Basil Blackwell), pp. 1-54; IDEM, Crises and Trends in 
the Late Middle Ages, [Translation of  IDEM, Crisi e congiunture nei secoli XIV e XV, in La Storia: I 
grandi problemi, Turin 1988]; republished in IDEM, The Medieval Market Economy, pp. 185-224; P. 
Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe, Cambridge 1988, Part III: ‘The Late Middle 
Ages,’ pp. 267-396; and in particular, chapter 15: ‘The Bullion-Famines of  the Later Middle 
Ages,’ pp. 339-362. 
2 See the evidence in J. MUNRO, Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval Eng-
land and the Low Countries, in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. 
RICHARDS, Durham North Carolina 1983 (Carolina Academic Press), pp. 97-158, but especially 
pp. 112-126, Appendix, pp. 127-155, and Graphs I-III, pp. 156-158. Reprinted in IDEM, Bullion 
Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500, Aldershot-Brookfield 1992 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355). 
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omy suffered from any relatively larger loss of  precious metals in its interna-
tional trade: not when we consider that it had become so much smaller, with 
declining population, over the course of  the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries, with, consequently, a contracting demand for money.  
Instead, in my view, there were two other, much more compelling factors 
to explain periodic and relative scarcities of  coined money. The first was a pe-
riodic if  often chronic reduction in the income velocity of  money, combined 
with very closely related hoarding.3 As I have contended in several publica-
tions, the ever increasing stain of  warfare across the Mediterranean basin and 
western Europe from the 1290s, leading into the far better known Hundred 
Years’ War (1337-1453), so often financed by coinage debasements, and ac-
companied by rising taxation, trade bans and other commercial barriers, had 
three far-reaching consequences for the European economy in the next two 
centuries. The first was a marked increase in transportation and transactions 
costs in international trade; the second, and closely related consequence, was 
a set of  various impediments to the flow of  bullion and specie in that trade; 
the third was the development of  proto-Mercantilist bullionist policies, re-
flecting or inspired by those impediments, that were designed to prevent or 
curb the export of  precious metals and encourage their inflow (more specifi-
cally into the ruler’s mints). Those policies merely severely to exacerbate in-
ternational conflicts and to promote more coinage debasements – and the 
operations of  Gresham’s Law – further reducing the circulation and income 
velocity of  money. In other words impediments to the flow of  money were 
more important than reductions in the stock of  metals.4 
                                                     
3 The income velocity of  money is V in the modernized Fisher-Friedman Equation of  
Exchange, the best known version of  the Quantity Theory of  money: M.V = P.y. Hoarding is 
represented by k in the Cambridge Cash Balances demand-for-money theory: M = k.P.y. In 
both equations M stands for the current stock of  money (however defined); P stands for the 
Price level (Consumer Price Index); and y stands for real (deflated) net national product and 
net national income, in the Keynesian equation: Y = C + I + G + (X - M): i.e., national income 
(current money) is the sum of  aggregate consumption, investment, government expenditures 
and net exports (total exports minus imports, including services). Mathematically, therefore, V 
and k are reciprocals: k = 1/V. But k is also a measure of  Keynesian Liquidity Preference, as 
the sum of  the public’s desire to hold active cash balances, instead of  investing or spending 
them, for these three motives, explaining the demand for money in general: the transactions-
demand motive, the precautionary motive, and the speculative or investment motive.. 
4 See the sources cited in n. 2 above. For a different view, see J. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ 
Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of  Compara-
tive Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes, in “The International Journal of  Maritime 
History”, 11, 1999. 2, pp. 1-30; IDEM, The “New Institutional Economics” and the Changing Fortunes 
of  Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, in 
“Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte”, 88, 2001, 1, pp. 1-47; IDEM, The Me-
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At the same time, the European stock of  precious metals, especially sil-
ver, was being reduced by the second problem: problems in European min-
ing, whose technology, in later-medieval Europe, was probably inferior to that 
practised under the Romans. Over the centuries, the chief  mines, to be found 
in Germany and south Central Europe, exploited the most readily accessible 
ore seams. Inevitably, as those seams became depleted, most mining enter-
prises experienced diminishing returns, rising marginal costs – and especially 
rising flood waters, since most mines were located in mountainous regions 
with underground streams. To be sure, some new silver mines in Sardinia, 
Bosnia, and Serbia had provided new sources of  silver to counteract, in part, 
falling outputs from the older mines. Those new mines offered, however, only a 
temporary palliative, as they, too experienced diminishing returns – and worse. 
Indeed by 1439-41, most of  the silver mines of  Bosnia and Serbia had fallen 
into the hands of  the conquering Ottoman Turks, and the rest by 1459.5 
As I have also argued, the various innovations – chiefly by Italians – in 
medieval credit and banking failed to counteract these periodic scarcities of  
coined money in the late-medieval European economy. In the first place, all 
of  the major advances in medieval financial institutions, beginning with de-
posit-and-transfer banking, and the bills-of-exchange banking had already 
taken place before such monetary scarcity became truly acute in the Euro-
pean economy, i.e., towards the end of  the fourteenth century.6 Second, credit 
                                                                                                                         
dieval Origins of  the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiablity, in “The International His-
tory Review”, 25, 2003, 3, pp. 505-562. 
5 J.U. NEF, Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618, in “Journal of  Political Economy”, 
49, 1941, pp. 575-591; J.U. NEF, Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilization, in Cambridge Eco-
nomic History of  Europe, II, Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, ed. M.M. POSTAN, Cambridge 
1952, pp. 456-469; reissued in The Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, II, Trade and Industry in 
the Middle Ages, M.M. POSTAN, E. MILLER eds., revised edn., Cambridge 1987, pp. 696-734; D. 
KOVACEVIC, Les mines d'or et d'argent en Serbie et en Bosnie médiévales, in « Annales ESC », 15, 1960, 
pp. 248-258; E. WESTERMANN, Zur Silber- und Kupferproduktion Mitteleuropas vom 15. bis zum frühen 
17. Jahrhundert: über Bedeutung und Rangfolge der Reviere von Schwaz, Mansfeld und Neusohl, in “Der 
Anschnitt: Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur im Bergbau”, 38, 1986, pp. 187-211. For the 
Serbian and Ottoman Turks’ exploitation of  these mines, see S. PAMUK, A Monetary History of  
the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge-New York 2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stud-
ies in Islamic Civilization), pp.  36-38, 44-45; B. BOJOVIC, Entre Venise et l’Empire ottoman: les mé-
taux précieux des Balkans (XVe - XVIe siècle), in “Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales”, 60, 2005, 
6, pp. 1277-1297.  With the Ottoman conquest, ‘le déclin des mines était irréversible’ (p.  1291), 
and exports outside the Ottoman domains were forbidden 
6 See R. DE ROOVER, L'evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles, Paris 1953 
(S.E.V.P.E.N.); IDEM, New Interpretations of  the History of  Banking, in “Journal of  World History”, 
2, 1954, pp. 38-76; IDEM, The Rise and Decline of  the Medici Bank, 1397-1494, Cambridge Mass. 
1963; IDEM, Early Banking Before 1500 and the Development of  Capitalism, in “Review of  the His-
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remained tied to and a function of  the availability of  coined money. Peter 
Spufford has clearly made this point in his eloquent comments on the adverse 
economic consequences of  hoarding:7 
 
Fear of  disorder made men conceal their coin. Fear of  not being able to replace 
coin made men the keener to keep their assets liquid. With scarcity of  coin went a re-
luctance to spend or invest what one had in hand, so that there was a sluggish circula-
tion, which in itself  was equivalent to a further reduction in the available quantity of  
coin. . ... Finally fear of  the failure to repay cut back on credit. This too was partially 
a consequence of  the shortage of  money and was also a cause of  yet further shortage.  
 
Fully supporting Spufford in his views that the problems from a growing 
scarcity of  circulating specie were actually exacerbated by a credit contraction 
that worsened existing deflationary conditions are recent publications of  
Pamela Nightingale, Reinhold Muller, and Frank Spooner. 8 
The most effective proof  for the contention that credit and financial in-
stitutions did not counteract monetary contraction in the late-medieval Euro-
pean economy, and indeed that such periodic contractions did take place, is 
the statistical evidence on prolonged deflation. Many economists, especially 
those steeped in the traditions of  Classical Economics, would contend, how-
ever, that neither monetary scarcity nor deflation should have posed any 
problems, since presumably all prices and factor costs would have moved di-
rectly together in tandem. But the statistical evidence that I have produced 
for late-medieval England and the Low Countries refutes any such notions 
and demonstrates that because of  long-term ‘stickiness’ of  nominal money 
wages, interest rates, and rents (i.e., for the latter two, those stipulated in long 
term contracts), deflation increased the real burden of  all these factor costs.9 
                                                                                                                         
tory of  Banking”, 4, 1971, pp. 1-16; H. VAN DER WEE, European Banking in the Middle Ages and 
Early Modern Period (476-1789), in A History of  European Banking, Antwerp 20002, IDEM, G. 
KURGAN-VAN HENTENRIJK eds., pp. 152-180; J. MUNRO, Medieval Origins of  the Financial Revolu-
tion, cit., pp. 505-562. 
7 P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, cit., pp. 345-347. 
8 P. NIGHTINGALE, Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England, in 
“Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 43, 1990, pp. 560-575; R. MUELLER, ‘Chome l’ucciello di 
passegio’: la demande saisonnière des espèces et le marché des changes à Venise au moyen âge’, in Études d'his-
toire monétaire, XIIe-XIXe siècles, ed. J. DAY, Lille 1984 (Université de Paris VII), pp. 195-220; F. 
SPOONER, The International Economy and Monetary Movements in France, 1493-1725, Paris 1956; 
Harvard 1972, for the English edn, also cited by P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, cit., p. 347. 
9 See J. MUNRO, Bullionism and the Bill of  Exchange in England, cit., pp. 169-239; IDEM, Bullion 
Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, in Precious Metals in 
the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS, Durham North Carolina 1983 
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Thus medieval and early modern concerns about the effects of  monetary 
scarcity had some real justification. 
At the same time, hoarding was also a rational response to the deflation-
ary consequences of  monetary contraction – for indeed, to repeat an earlier 
observation, all three periods of  such monetary scarcity listed above were 
eras of  stark deflation (with intervening periods of  inflation, generally the 
fruits of  war-induced coinage debasements). Obviously the fall in the general 
price level – the true meaning of  the term deflation – increased the purchas-
ing power of  silver, by ounce or gram, in that most of  the standard medieval 
moneys-of-account, in which prices were expressed (and by which we meas-
ure deflation), were tied to the currently circulating silver penny (denier, denaro, 
Pfennig, groot). 
 
The problem of  declining mining outputs: Deflation as the spur to technological changes 
Such deflation also helped to provide the solution for problems of  late-
medieval monetary contraction. The mid-century, from the 1440s to the 
1460s, marked the nadir of  the late-medieval European deflations. Insofar as 
that specific deflation did increase the purchasing power of  silver, it thereby 
provided the profit motive for inducing the necessary technological changes 
that created the subsequent South German or Central European silver-copper 
mining boom.10 That revolutionary boom in silver mining outputs was the 
product of  two interrelated sets of  technological changes. The first was in 
mechanical engineering: the invention of  horse-powered and water-powered 
piston-operated drainage pumps, to pump water from much deeper ore shafts 
                                                                                                                         
(Carolina Academic Press), pp. 97-158; reprinted in IDEM, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in 
England and the Low Countries, 1350 - 1500, Aldershot 1992 (Ashgate, Variorum Collected Stud-
ies series CS 355); IDEM, The Central European Mining Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low 
Countries and England, 1450 - 1550, in Money, Coins, and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of  
Asia and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern Times), ed. E.H.G. VAN CAUWENBERGHE, Leuven 
1991 (Leuven University Press, Studies in Social and Economic History), pp. 119-183; IDEM, 
Patterns of  Trade, Money, and Credit, in Handbook of  European History in the Later Middle Ages, Ren-
aissance and Reformation, 1400 - 1600, I, Structures and Assertions , J. TRACY, TH. BRADY JR., H. O-
BERMAN eds., Leiden 1004 (E.J. Brill), pp. 147-195; IDEM, Wage Stickiness, Monetary Changes, and 
Real Incomes in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, 1300 - 1500: Did Money Matter?, in 
“Research in Economic History”, 21, 2003, pp. 185-297; IDEM, The Medieval Origins of  the Finan-
cial Revolution, cit., pp. 505-562. 
10 See J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins of  the ‘Price Revolution’: South German Silver Mining, 
Merchant-Banking, and Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540, in Global Connections and Monetary History, 
1470-1800, D. FLYNN, A. GIRÁLDEZ, R. VON GLAHN eds., Aldershot-Brookfield 2003 (Ashgate 
Publishing), pp. 1-34; and IDEM, The Central European Mining Boom, cit., pp. 119-183. 
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up to the surface by stages.11 Water seepage was always a very serious problem 
that had limited the extent of  mine shafts in mountainous regions; and a com-
plementary solution was the construction of  downward-sloping adits, dug into 
mountain sides, to drain or divert the voluminous underground waters.  
The second technological revolution was in chemical engineering: the in-
vention of  the Saigerhütten process of  smelting silver-based ores. The basic 
problem that the Central European ore bodies had presented was the mixture 
of  silver with copper whose separation could not be effected at reasonable 
cost by any known means. The solution was provided by mixing lead with the 
argentiferous-cupric ores in the smelting process (also made economically 
possible by water-powered piston pumps, to fan the furnace flames of  the 
charcoal fuels): the lead combined with the silver, thus separating out the 
copper; and then the lead, with a very low melting point, was readily sepa-
rated from the silver by re-smelting.  
 
The South-German Central European silver-copper mining boom, c.1460-c.1540 
The result of  this mining boom was a vast increase – possibly a quintu-
pling – of  Europe’s supply of  mined silver. According to some estimates that 
I have produced, which inevitably must under-report the actual quantities of  
metals mined, in view of  the absence of  adequate data for many of  the new 
mines, silver outputs from mines in Saxony, Thuringia, the Tyrol, Bohemia, 
Slovakia, and Hungary rose 329.4 percent: from a quinquennial mean of  
12,973.44 kg in 1471-75 to one of  55,703.84 kg in 1536-40, the period of  
maximum outputs. Thereafter outputs fell to a mean of  39,882.76 kg in 1546-
50, by which time cheaper silver was arriving in Seville from the Spanish 
Americas. The noted American economic historian John Nef, the first to at-
tempt a documentation of  this silver-mining boom, has provided much 
higher minimum and maximum estimates for a slightly earlier period: in 1526-
1535: between 84,200 kg and 91,200 kg a year.12 
In my view, this South-German Central European silver mining boom 
provides the initial monetary cause of  the Price Revolution, which ensued 
from the 1520s – long before any substantial quantity of  silver had arrived 
from the Americas. Indeed, the quantity of  that European mined silver pro-
                                                     
11 The pumps created a vacuum; and air-pressure, acting against this vacuum, thus lifted 
up the water, from one level of  troughs to another. See PH. BRAUNSTEIN, Innovations in Mining 
and Metal Production in the Late Middle Ages, in “Journal of  European Economic History”, 12, 
1983, pp. 573-591; and sources in n. 5. 
12 J.U. NEF, Silver Production, cit., pp. 575-591. In his view, even the lower-bound estimate 
represents a quintupling of  silver mining outputs from the mid-15th century. 
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duced during the peak output of  the late 1530s would not be exceeded by 
Spanish American imports until the early 1560s.13 
 
The Venetian trade with the Levant: Cotton and the fustians industry in Italy and South 
Germany in the later fourteenth century 
This South-German dominated silver-copper mining boom also provides 
a central theme in this study because of  its close connection to later-medieval 
Venetian trade with the Mamlūk Levant, in particular the trade in Syrian cot-
ton, so much of  which was sold to textile producers in South Germany. De-
spite a few important, if  now older, studies on this subject, most medieval 
economic historians have not given cotton the attention that it deserves, par-
ticularly as a component in the manufacture of  relatively cheap, light-weight, 
and very popular Italian textiles known as fustians: with a linen (flax) warp 
yarn and a cotton weft yarn. They were a much softer and finer textile than 
were the purely flax-based linens in the same if  somewhat lower price range.14 
The name fustian is thought to be derived from the Cairo industrial suburb of  
al-Fustāt (Fostat), where reputedly this textile industry had its tenth-century 
origins, in using a combination of  domestic flax for the linen warp yarns, and 
imported Syrian and/or South Asian cotton for the weft yarns.  
Fustian-manufacturing quickly spread elsewhere in the Mediterranean ba-
sin, but most especially in Lombard Italy. In a study of  Genoese trade with 
Sicily, Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople, during the second half  of  the twelfth 
century, Hilmar Krueger concluded that northern textiles, especially the 
lighter weight and relatively cheap says and serges, had predominated in this 
                                                     
13 J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., pp. 1-34. Those imports jumped from an annual 
mean of  27,145.03 kg in 1556-60 to one of  83,373.92 kg in 1561-65, thanks to the recent ap-
plication of  the Mercury Amalgamation process in the Spanish mines in ‘Peru’ (modern day 
Bolivia) and Mexico. 
14 See M. MAZZAOUI, The Cotton Industry of  Northern Italy in the Late Middle Ages, 1150-1450, 
in “Journal of  Economic History”, 32, 1972, pp. 262-286; EADEM, The Italian Cotton Industry in 
the Later Middle Ages, 1100 – 1600, Madison 1981, pp. 1-129; K. KELLENBENZ, The Fustian Indus-
try of  the Ulm Region in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries, in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval 
Europe: Essays in Memory of  Professor E. M. Carus-Wilson, N.B. HARTE, K.G. PONTING eds., Lon-
don 1983 (Pasold Studies in Textile History, 2), pp. 259-278; W. VON STROMER, Die Gründung der 
Baumwollindustrie im Mitteluropa: Wirtschaftspolitik im Spätmittelalter, Stuttgart 1978; IDEM, 
Wirtschaftspolitik im Spätmittelalter: Die Gründung der Baumwoll-Industrie in Oberungarn in Jahr 1411, 
in Studi in memoria di Federigo Melis, L de ROSA, ed., I-V, Naples 1978 (Giannini), III, pp. 245-270. 
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trade, over all Italian and other Mediterranean textiles, of  which ‘only the 
Lombard fustians formed an impressive item of  export’.15  
Their subsequent importance has been most fully revealed in Maureen 
Mazzaoui’s important monograph on The Italian Cotton Industry, in which she 
contended that by the mid-thirteenth century the Lombard fustian textile 
crafts had become a ‘mass-production’ industry, which then reached its peak 
in the early fourteenth century, when markets in the Mediterranean basin, 
having failed to maintain their former demographic growth, had ceased to 
grow at their former pace, so that they became saturated with a very large 
volume of  very similar, indeed undifferentiated, lighter, cheaper, and coarser 
textiles.16 As I have also argued, the subsequent decline in population elimi-
nated the marketing scale-economies necessary to sustain such ‘mass produc-
tion’ industries, while the steep rise in transportation and transaction costs 
that ensued from the widening stain of  warfare in the Mediterranean basin 
eliminated profits for most ‘price-taking’ entrepreneurs and merchants in ex-
porting such cheaper textiles – most of  which were undistinguishable from 
rival substitute products. Thereafter, the scope of  their intentional commerce 
was gradually restricted to the far higher valued luxury woollens and silks, 
whose manufacturers were entrepreneurial ‘price-makers’ engaged in mo-
nopolistic competition, with highly differentiated products. 17 
Lombard cotton-fustian manufacturing, however, continued to retain a 
reasonably viable profitable existence, if  on a smaller scale, based on both the 
domestic Italian and nearby South German markets, for about another half-
century, until warfare once again delivered the Italian industry a near fatal 
blow, to the direct benefit of  South Germany. The first set of  wars were 
those that Louis I ‘the Great’, king of  Hungary launched against Venice in 
1356, seizing Dalmatia in 1358; and, with various if  changing alliances, he 
threatened Venice’s very existence, until Venice defeated the Hungarians at 
Foss Nouva in 1373.18 During these latter wars (in the 1360s), Louis had 
                                                     
15 H. KRUEGER, The Genoese Exportation of  Northern Cloths to Mediterranean Ports, Twelfth Cen-
tury, in “Belgische tijdschrift voor filologie en gescheidenis/Revue belge de philologie et d'his-
toire”, 65, 1987, pp. 722-750. 
16 M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 87-104. 
17 See J.H. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 
1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of  Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes, 
in “The International Journal of  Maritime History”, 11, 1999, 2, pp. 1-30; IDEM, The “New Insti-
tutional Economics” and the Changing Fortunes of  Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile 
Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, in “Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte”, 88, 2001, 1, pp. 1-47. 
18 For Venice’s subsequent dire threat to its existence, in the war with Genoa 1378-81, see 
below p. 918. 
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gained support from his former father-in-law Emperor Charles IV (King of  
Bohemia, r.1355-78) and from the South German Swabian towns, who had 
been loyal and important customers of  Lombard fustians, which they had 
been purchasing chiefly at Venice.  
The second set of  wars were those that Charles IV, in alliance with Pope 
Urban V (r. 1362-70) launched against Bernabo Visconti, Signore or ruler of  
Milan – the chief  town of  Lombardy -- in 1367-69.19 As a consequence of  
these various wars, the trade in Lombard fustians with South Germany became 
periodically disrupted, and very costly to transact. Evidently the major Austrian 
and South German (Swabian) towns therefore chose to establish their own 
fustian crafts as import-substitution industries, in fact replacing their already 
existing coarse linen industries: in Vienna, in 1369; in Augsburg, in 1372; in 
Nördlingen, in 1375; in Landshut and Ulm, in 1375. The necessary flax was 
obtained locally, while the requisite cotton was purchased from Venice.20 
Venice itself  had begun importing significant amounts of  raw cotton 
from Mamlūk Syria and Palestine, and also Cyprus, just shortly before these 
events, chiefly for sale to the Lombard fustian industries; and Syria-Palestine 
had certainly been the principal source of  cotton as well for the Italian cot-
ton-fustians industries. As noted earlier, this region had also been supplying 
the Cairo region with cotton from the tenth century, as well as furnishing the 
raw material for its own textile industries. Italian trade (Pisa and Venice, prin-
cipally) has been well documented for this region during the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries, and even after the Fall of  Acre in 1291 (with the ensuring 
papal prohibitions on trade with the Mamlūks, lasting until 1344).21 
Certainly the establishment and evidently rapid growth of  the South 
German fustian industries from the 1360s provided Venice with a very strong 
incentive to enlarge its imports of  Syrian, Palestinian, and Cypriot cotton. 
Ashtor, in a noted article on this very trade, contends that ‘the great upsurge 
of  cotton planting and the export of  raw and spun cotton began in the sec-
                                                     
19 W.T. WAUGH, Germany: Charles IV, in The Cambridge Med,ieval History, VII, Decline of  Em-
pire and Papacy, J.R. TANNER, C.W. PREVITÉ-ORTON, Z. N. BROOKE eds., Cambridge-New York 
1958 (Cambridge University Press), pp. 137-154, 148-151. 
20 See W. VON STROMER, Die Gründung der Baumwollindustrie, cit.; K. KELLENBENZ, The Fus-
tian Industry, cit., pp. 259-261; M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 129-153; E. 
ASHTOR, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton-Oxford 1983 (Princeton University 
Press), pp. 92-93. 
21 See above p. 914; and E. ASHTOR, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria in the Later Middle 
Ages, in “Studi Medievali”, XVII, 1976, pp. 675-715, reprinted in IDEM, Studies on Levantine 
Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74), no. VII [same pagination]; 
IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 3-63. 
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ond half  of  the fourteenth century’, specifying that the major districts came 
to be Aleppo, Latakia, Sarmin in northern Syria, Hamath (or Hamā) in central 
Syria, and Acre in Palestine, where cotton cultivation may have displaced, to 
some extent, grain cultivation, when the Levantine population declined after 
the Black Death and when cotton offered better financial returns in agricul-
ture. Ashtor also contends that Syrian cotton was of  a much higher quality 
than that obtained from Anatolia (modern Turkey), Cyprus, Sicily, or Malta. 
Within Syria, Baalbek was the major centre for manufacturing woven cotton 
textiles, which the Venetians also exported, in significant quantities, to various 
European markets.22 
The Venetian cotton trade from the Levant and Cyprus was almost dis-
rupted at the very outset of  the burgeoning German demand by a very bitter, 
destructive, and ongoing war between the kingdom of  Cyprus (Peter I) and 
the Mamlūk Sultan, which had reached a fever pitch with the Cypriot sack of  
Alexandria in 1365, followed by other Cypriot corsair attacks on Levantine 
coastal towns in 1367 and 1368. The Sultan’s retaliatory measures included 
arrests of  all available European merchants, and confiscation of  their goods 
and property (in both Egypt and Syria), including those of  the Venetians and 
Genoese, whose support of  the Cypriots and Catalan allies was, at best, luke-
warm. In June 1369, Genoa and Venice, with full support from Pope Urban 
V, terminated (ostensibly) all trade with the Mamlūk Sultanate. Yet in Decem-
ber 1370 a joint Venetian-Genoese embassy secured a peace treaty with the 
Mamlūks, one that also included Cyprus and Catalonia. According to Ashtor, 
some thirty years of  peace and commercial prosperity ensued in the Levant 
trade – though really only after Venice had avoided almost certain destruction 
and defeated its arch enemy Genoa, at the Battle of  Chioggia, in 1381.  
 
Venetian trade with the Mamlūk Levant in the fifteenth-century 
During the ensuing decades, the Venetians gradually if  surely gained as-
cendancy in the Levant trade, but especially so in the cotton trade. Ashtor es-
timates that in the 1380s the Venetians were exporting about 3,500-5,000 
sacks of  Syrian cotton a year, and about 8,000 sacks in the 1390s (and almost 
                                                     
22 IDEM, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., pp. 677-685; but Ashtor contends, without 
proof, that ‘the greater part of  [the raw cotton] was exported to Europe’, and that ‘the growth 
of  the European fustian industry [Italian and German, evidently] gave a strong impetus to this 
branch of  the Levant trade’. See IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., Table XII, p. 175, for the price of  raw 
cotton in Venice, 1364-1402, with specific prices for cotton from Hamath, Acre, and Sarmin. 
On this cotton trade, see also M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, pp. 28-55. 
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12,000 sacks in 1400).23 In that very year, this trade was again threatened with 
disaster, by the invasions of  the Mongol conqueror Timūr (better known as 
Tamerlane), whose armies conquered Baghdad and Aleppo in 1400 and Da-
mascus in 1401, producing a sharp increase in prices for Syrian cotton. But 
then his armies retreated from the Mamlūk domains to attack the Ottoman 
Turks, capturing their Sultan Beyazid I (at Angora, 1402); and three years 
later, in 1405, while planning an invasion of  China, Timūr died – so that the 
Mongol threat quickly evaporated.24 
Whether or not Mamlūk economic fortunes nevertheless declined sharply 
thereafter, as Ashtor maintains, is a still a matter of  considerable dispute. He 
argues that a severe economic crisis was precipitated by ‘a crop failure and 
high prices in Egypt in 1403-04 and [was] aggravated by the long civil war 
under the reign of  the Sultan Faradj’.25 But his dismal depiction of  Mamlūk 
economic and especially industrial decline seems difficult to reconcile with his 
two other contentions. The first concerns the even greater growth in Ve-
netian prosperity, after the death of  Timūr, based essentially on the Levantine 
trade, even if  that prosperity was partly based on Venice’s skilful diplomacy 
and commercial skills in reducing the extent of  Genoese and Catalan compe-
tition; and the second concerns Ashtor’s data on Venetian balance of  pay-
ments with the Levant at the end of  the fifteenth century, a crucial matter to 
be considered later in this study.  
Undoubtedly, however, Ashtor is correct in emphasising the growing role 
of  Syrian cotton in Venetian commerce, contending that ‘the cotton planta-
tions in Egypt and Syria were again increased at the end of  the fourteenth 
and the beginning of  the fifteenth century’. Certainly, as well, Venetian ex-
ports of  Syrian-Palestinian and Cypriot cotton was a very important factor in 
the continued growth of  the South German fustian industries. The South 
Germans, it should be noted, came to Venice themselves in order to fetch 
that cotton, which was then transported across the Alps, chiefly by the Bren-
ner Pass route.  
                                                     
23 E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 184-189. For the 1390s, Ashtor (p. 199) estimates that 
the total value of  Venetian trade with the Levant was 400,000 to 500,000 gold dinars; 200,000 
to 300,000 dinars for the Genoese; and 200,000 to 250,000 dinars for the Catalans; but these 
amounts are influenced by unusually high prices for Asian spices in the 1390s. See also, IDEM, 
The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., pp. 708-713. 
24 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 88-102. 
25 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., p. 204. He cites a Mamlūk census indicating that the number of  
textile looms in Alexandria had fallen from about 14,000 in the 1390s to just 800 in 1434; even 
if  this report is valid, some of  that decline was due to demographic and not purely commer-
cial-industrial factors. 
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The South German fustians industry, precious metals, English woollens, and the rise of  the 
Antwerp Market in the mid-fifteenth century 
Certainly, by at least the 1440s, the South German fustian manufacturers 
had expanded to become the single most important supplier of  these rela-
tively inexpensive, light, but still good quality textiles for European markets. 
They represent, in fact, the first important example of  a cheaper-line textile 
industry that achieved a major growth in output in the later-medieval Euro-
pean economy, whose textiles markets had become so dominated now by 
luxury woollen and silk fabrics. By the early sixteenth century, the Swabian 
city of  Ulm was producing over 100,000 pieces annually, an output that was, 
however, according to Mazzaoui, ‘far surpassed by the city of  Augsburg’ (for 
which no data are supplied).26 The importance of  these South German fus-
tians on the Antwerp market in the mid sixteenth century – when about 
100,000 pieces were sold there a year – is demonstrated in Guicciardini’s fa-
mous survey of  that port’s commerce.27  
In order to understand more fully the rise of  the Antwerp market, the re-
vival of  the European economy from the mid-fifteenth century depression, 
and then the expansion of  the entire West European economy into the six-
teenth century, we must now examine in greater depth the following related 
economic factors: the role of  South German commerce, especially its role in 
the Central European silver-copper mining boom; the expansion of  interna-
tional trade in textiles; and the consequent growth in Venetian-Levantine 
trade, all from the 1460s. 
As Herman Van der Wee has demonstrated in his magisterial Rise of  the 
Antwerp Market and the European Economy, and then in several other publica-
tions, both the European economic recovery and Antwerp’s rise to become 
Europe’s leading financial-commercial centre were fundamentally based on 
the revival and re-establishment of  overland, continental trade routes, which 
                                                     
26 M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 140-141; see also K. KELLENBENZ, The 
Fustian Industry, cit., pp. 259-62 (also without data). 
27 W. BRULEZ, Le commerce international des Pays-Bas au XVI siècle: essai d'appréciation quantita-
tive, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire”, 46, 1968, pp. 1205-1221; republished as IDEM, 
The Balance of  Trade of  the Netherlands in the Middle of  the 16th Century, in “Acta historiae neer-
landica: Historical studies in the Netherlands”, 4, 1970, pp. 20-48: from L. GUICCIARDINI, De-
scrittioni di tutti i Paesi Bassi, Antwerp 1567, pp. 124-126. Given the very wide variety of  
commodities sold there, and their relative cheapness, we should not dismiss the importance of  
the fustians merely on grounds of  absolute value: about 240,000 Carolus florins or £40,000 
groot Flemish = about 1.3% of  the total value of  transactions in 1560: 18,500,000 florins = 
£3,083,333 groot. 
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now ran through Germany.28 European economic expansion in the earlier 
Commercial Revolution era, from the twelfth to late thirteenth centuries, had 
been fundamentally dependent on other overland routes, especially the 
French routes running from Flanders through the Champagne Fairs and 
down the Rhone valley route to Marseilles and then Genoa. When the afore-
mentioned European and Mediterranean warfare, from the 1290s, and the 
consequent sharp rise in transport and transaction costs, virtually eliminated 
these routes as major conduits of  international trade, diverting that trade to the 
far longer maritime routes, via the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, not only 
did the Champagne and other international fairs disappear, but, for reasons 
more fully explored in the Van der Wee-Peeters model, the aggregate volume 
and value of  international trade also suffered a disproportionate contraction 
(i.e., declined, in their view, more than did the aggregate population).29 
The new overland, continental routes were developed, from the 1440s, in 
a far different trajectory, to the east, one that was now free from the ravages 
of  warfare and insecurity: running from Venice, across the Brenner Pass into 
South Germany, and from there, via the Frankfurt Fairs, down the Rhine to 
the Low Countries. They terminated at the combined Brabant Fairs of  Ant-
werp and Bergen-op-Zoom, which had earlier begun their existence as purely 
regional foodstuffs fairs. That direct overland route, it must be noted, in-
volved a distance that was less than 20 percent of  that required by sea (via the 
Adriatic, Mediterranean, Straits of  Gibraltar, and the Atlantic). It was also a 
considerably safer, more secure route, involving a greater certainty of  time 
spent in transit, a requisite condition for the functioning of  regional and in-
ternational fairs.30  
As Van der Wee has argued so cogently, these new overland continental 
trading routes, along with the revival of  the continental fairs – at Geneva, Be-
sançon, Lyons, as well as at Frankfurt and Antwerp -- fed into an interlacing 
network of  regional trade routes. Thus they promoted a rapid economic ex-
pansion by a macro-economic multiplier-accelerator mechanism; and such 
                                                     
28 H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 14th to 16th Cen-
turies, I-III, The Hague 1963, II, Interpretation, pp. 113-161. See the next note. 
29 IDEM, TH. PEETERS, Un modèle dynamique de croissance interseculaire du commerce mondiale, 
XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, in “Annales ESC”, 15, 1970, pp. 100-128. See also a further elaboration of  
these views in H. VAN DER WEE, Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and 
Particularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750, in The Rise of  Merchant Empires: 
Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. J. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, pp. 14-
33. See also J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of  Trade, cit., .pp. 147-195; J.H. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ Ex-
port Trade, cit., pp. 1-30; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, cit., pp. 1-47. 
30 See the sources cited in nn. 28-29. 
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trade involved hundreds of  more towns than had been served by maritime 
routes (whose role and significance then waned in Europe itself, from the 
later fifteenth century). For Van der Wee, such trade served as the chief  en-
gine of  economic growth in early-modern Europe – and not demographic 
factors, for population growth was (in his view and mine) more the conse-
quence than the cause of  this aggregate economic expansion. 
Chiefly instrumental in the development of  these new overland routes, 
and in the development of  the new fairs of  Frankfurt and Brabant were the 
Germans – both the Cologne-based Rhenish Hanse and then the South 
Germans, whose leading merchant banking families, the Fuggers especially, 
had secured a dominant role in both the manufacture and trade of  the 
Swabian fustians, which they marketed in both sets of  these growing interna-
tional fairs. The subsequent rise of  the Antwerp fairs in particular to achieve 
commercial and financial dominance in the European economy, from the 1460s 
to the 1560s, was based on a tripod that consisted of, first, English woollens, 
then the South German metals (silver and copper) and fustians, and finally, 
from 1501, Portuguese spices – from their conquests in the Indian Ocean.31 
The English had established the first leg in 1421, when Antwerp became 
the overseas trading staple or entrepot for their woollen cloth exports, under 
the organization of  the London-based Merchants Adventurers. Having been 
excluded from Flanders (Bruges) and the Baltic (Danzig) – and the latter had 
seemed so promising for their cloth exports from the 1380s – the English re-
ceived a warm welcome in Antwerp (liberated from Flanders only in 1405), 
chiefly because it no longer had a local woollen cloth industry to protect. For 
reasons that I have explored elsewhere, the English draperies were now pro-
ducing good quality woollens at a much lower price than were their rivals in 
Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, whose luxury-oriented draperies had become 
dependent on heavily-taxed English wools – then the world’s finest wools. 
Indeed, the English cloth industry’s chief  advantage was in using these very 
                                                     
31 For the following see: J.A. VAN HOUTTE, La genèse du grand marché international d'Anvers à 
la fin du moyen âge, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire”, 19, 1940, pp. 87-126; H. VAN DER 
WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, 73-124; J.A. VAN HOUTTE, Bruges et Anvers: marchés 
`nationaux' ou `internationaux' du XIVe au XVIe siècle?, in “Revue du Nord”, 24, 1952, pp. 89-108; 
J J.A. VAN HOUTTE, Anvers aux XVe et XVIe siècle, in “Annales ESC”, 16, 1961, pp. 248-278; J.H. 
MUNRO, Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth: An Incident in the Shift of  Commerce from 
Bruges to Antwerp in the Late Fifteenth Century, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/Belgisch 
tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis”, 44, 1966, pp. 1137-1159; J.H. MUNRO, Medieval Wool-
lens: The Western European Woollen Industries and their Struggles for International Markets, c.1000-1500, 
in The Cambridge History of  Western Textiles, I-II, ed. D. JENKINS, Cambridge-New York 2003 
(Cambridge University Press), I, chapter 5, pp. 228-324; J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of  Trade, cit., .pp. 
147-195; IDEM, The Central European Mining Boom, cit., pp. 119-183. 
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same fine wools, the chief  determinant of  textile quality, tax free. The Eng-
lish also sought to obviate the chief  comparative advantage of  their Nether-
lander rivals by having more and more of  their woollens dyed and finished in 
Antwerp (and in some neighbouring towns). Their chief  customers, at the 
Brabant Fairs, came to be the Rhenish merchants who so eagerly bought their 
finished woollens, as their chief  return cargo, to be marketed throughout 
Germany and Central Europe. From the 1460s, when the Central European 
mining boom really commenced, South German merchants began to displace 
the Rhenish as the chief  customers for English woollens at the Brabant Fairs, 
for the same reasons: as their prime return cargo in exchange for the growing 
quantities of  fustians, silver, and copper that they were bringing to Antwerp, 
whose mint re-opened, only in 1467.32 
The consequences, largely unintended, of  two related, competitive 
changes in English and Burgundian mint policies, in the mid 1460s, helped to 
promote both a greater flow of  South German silver to Antwerp and a boom 
in English cloth exports to the Antwerp fairs. First, in August 1464, the Eng-
lish king, Edward IV (r. 1461-83), debased the English silver coinage – which 
had been untouched since 1412 -- by 20.0 percent. That had the immediate 
effect of  lowering exchange rates and thus of  sharply reducing the market 
prices of  English woollens at the Antwerp fairs, at a time when countervail-
ing deflationary forces in England prevented any subsequent rise in English 
domestic prices.33 Second, Duke Philip the Good of  Burgundy (r. 1419-67) 
responded with a set of  somewhat lesser debasements in 1466-67, reducing 
the silver contents by 16.9 percent; but more important, his debasements al-
                                                     
32 See the sources in the previous note, and also: J.H. MUNRO, Anglo-Flemish Competition in 
the International Cloth Trade, 1340-1520, in “Publication du centre européen d’études bourgui-
gonnes”, 35, 1995, pp. 37-60 [Rencontres d'Oxford (septembre 1994): L’Angleterre et les pays bas bour-
guignonnes: relations et comparaisons, XVe-XVIe siècle, ed. J.-M. CAUCHIES]; J.H. MUNRO, The 
Symbiosis of  Towns and Textiles: Urban Institutions and the Changing Fortunes of  Cloth Manufacturing in 
the Low Countries and England, 1270-1570, in “The Journal of  Early Modern History: Contacts, 
Comparisons, Contrasts”, 3, 1991, 1, pp. 1-74; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, 
cit., pp. 1-47. 
33 The silver contents of  the English sterling penny were reduced from 0.899 gram to 
0.719 gram; and the value of  fine silver rose from £4.634 per kg to £5.793 per kg. The Phelps 
Brown & Hopkins price index in fact fell from a mean of  101.497 in 1461-65 to one of  98.538 
in 1476-80; and, despite some rise in the 1480s (with supply shocks), the mean was still only 
98.538 in 196-1500 (Mean of  1451-75 = 100.0). Data calculated from CH. CHALLIS, Appendix I: 
Mint Output, 1220-1985, in A New History of  the Royal Mint, ed. IDEM, Cambridge 1992, pp. 673-
698; and E.H. PHELPS BROWN, S.V. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of  the Prices of  Consumables Compared 
with Builders’ Wage-Rates, in “Economica”, 23, 1956, p. 92, reprinted in IDEM, A Perspective of  
Wages and Prices, London 1981, pp. 13-59, but with corrections from data in their working papers 
in the Archives of  the British Library of  Economic and Political Science: Phelps Brown Papers. 
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tered the bimetallic mint ratio from 11.98:1 to 10:83:1, thereby increasing the 
relative value of  silver and thus the incentive to bring South German silver to 
mints in the Low Countries. There was no such incentive to take the silver to 
English mints, because Edward IV’s 1465 debasement (of  gold) had also al-
tered the bimetallic ratio in the opposite direction: raising the bimetallic ratio 
from 10.33:1 to 11.16:1.34 Thus increased flows of  German silver to Antwerp 
meant an augmented German demand for English woollens. 
The very significant results can be seen in the relevant statistics. English 
broadcloth exports rose from a mean of  29,001.6 pieces (24 yds by 1.75 yd) 
in 1461-65 to one of  62,583.4 pieces in 1496-1500 – a rise of  115.8 percent. 
The English cloth exports finally peaked in 1546-50 at 135,189.50 pieces; and 
over this period, London’s share of  total cloth exports, almost all of  which 
went to Antwerp, rose from 55.3 percent to 91.6 percent.35 One should also 
note that the first major Tudor enclosure movement, largely then designed to 
produce the wool for cloth manufacturing, almost exactly parallels this ninety-
year sustained cloth export boom. 
In Antwerp itself, its mint outputs rose from an annual mean of  1,475.96 
kg fine silver in 1466-70 (when, to repeat, minting had first re-commenced 
there) to one of  5,262.975 kg in 1476-80 – though some of  that was silver 
recycled in coinage debasement. The annual mean of  the quantity minted in 
1496-1500, when no significant debasements occurred, was 2,801.05 kg, 
about double that of  Antwerp’s initial mint outputs. The total amount of  sil-
ver coined in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands (Brabant, Flanders, 
Namur, Holland-Zealand) in 1496-1500, expressed as a quinquennial means, 
was 5,345.91 kg; and in England, the quinquennial mean output for this pe-
riod was 2,490.94 kg – so that the combined total of  fine silver coined in 
these two countries was 7,836.85 kg. For this same quinquennium, the total 
mean quantity of  fine gold minted was 753.559 kg: 474.633 kg in the Bur-
gundian-Habsburg Netherlands and 278.926 kg in England.36 
                                                     
34 For mint ratios, calculated in terms of  the two pure (fine) metals, see J.H. MUNRO, Bul-
lion Flows, cit., Table 10, pp. 148-52; J.H. MUNRO, Wool, Cloth and Gold, cit., pp. 155-179, and 
Appendix: Table C, pp. 198-199, Table G, p. 204, Tables J-K, pp. 209-210. Note that the bi-
metallic ratios in Table C are based on English and Flemish standards of  fineness, not on val-
ues of  the pure metals; and therefore they differ from the ones cited here. See also J.H. 
MUNRO, Anglo-Flemish Competition, cit., pp. 37-60; J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., pp. 1-34; 
H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, pp. 119-142. 
35 See sources concerning the textile trades in n. 31; and also J.H. MUNRO, Medieval Wool-
lens, cit., Tables 5.3 and 5.4, pp. 304-307; and also pp. 292-296. 
36 J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., Table 1.4, pp. 12-13; Table 1.5, pp. 16-17 (but in-
cluding only mint outputs of  Flanders and Brabant). 
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South German silver and Venetian trade with the Levant in the late fifteenth-century: al-
ternative perspectives on the ‘balance of  payments problem’ 
We may compare those statistics with some that Ashtor has supplied to 
estimate Venice’s deficit on balance of  payments with the Levant in roughly 
the same period, in the later 1490s, when, according to Ashtor, Venice’s Le-
vant trade had reached its apogee. In several publications, he has provided a 
variety of  sometimes confusing estimates of  trade balances. In one publica-
tion (1976), he contends that Venice then purchased Oriental goods with a 
total value of  about 500,000 ducats in the Levant: about 400,000 ducats in 
spices and dyestuffs, and the other 100,000 ducats in ‘cotton, silk, jewels, and 
potash’(and/or alkalis). He also concludes that the ‘Venetians’ Levantine trade 
had increased by 33% in 100 years’: in part at the expense of  Genoese and 
Catalan trade, but also in part in response to a growth in European demand 
for Oriental goods (including cotton).37 In a more recent publication (1983), 
he contended that, in this decade, the Venetian galleys to Alexandria (Egypt) 
and Beirut (Syria) contained cargoes worth between 450,000 and 550,000 
ducats, of  which 300,000 to 360,000 ducats were in specie (or coin and bul-
lion): i.e., from 60 to 65 percent of  the total value of  the cargoes.38 He also 
stated that the total value of  European manufactured goods and raw materi-
als – especially in the form of  various textiles, glass wares, soap, paper prod-
ucts, grains, timber, iron, and copper – together ‘amounted perhaps to a third’ 
of  that total investment.39  
                                                     
37 E. ASHTOR, The Volume of  Levantine Trade in the Later Middle Ages (1370-1498), in “Journal 
of  European Economic History”, 4, 1975, 3, pp. 573-612, with quotation on p. 609; reprinted 
in E. ASHTOR, Studies on Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints 
CS74). See also E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., p. 470, contending that the quantity of  pepper 
purchased in the Levant rose from 1,500-2,000 sportas in the early fifteenth century to 2,500 in 
the 1490s; and that the quantity of  ginger purchased rose from 2,000 kintārs s to 6,000 or 7,000 
kintārs over the same period; and E. ASHTOR, A Social and Economic History of  the Near East in the 
Middle Ages, London 1976 (Collins 1976), p. 328: contending that Venetian pepper exports from 
Alexandria rose from 283,050 kg in 1396 to 357,300 kg in 1498 (a rise of  26 percent); and that 
ginger exports rose from 36,000 kg in 1396 to 255,240 kg in 1498 (a rise of  609 percent). 
38 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 476-78. Compare these figures with those given from the 
Morosini chronicles, in A. STAHL, European Minting and the Balance of  Payments with the Islamic 
World in the Later Middle Ages, in Relazione economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico. Secc. XIII - XVIII, 
ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Firenze 2007 (Le Monnier, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. 
Datini”, Atti delle “Settimana di Studi” e altri convegni, 38). For one highly unusual year, 1433, 
following a commercial disruption, the Venetians exported 620,000 ducats in coin and bullion 
and 380,000 ducats worth of  goods to the Levant, for a total value of  about 1,000, 000 ducats: 
i.e., about the same ratio, here 62% in specie. But the average value of  total exports of  specie 
and goods to the Levant in the period 141-1431 was only a third of  that: about 334,000 ducats.  
39 IDEM, The Volume of  Levantine Trade, cit., p. 611. 
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But these estimates on the value of  trade conducted by the costly Alex-
andria and Beirut state galleys do not, therefore, include the value of  Syrian 
cotton and some other commodities that, because of  low value:weight ratios, 
were necessarily shipped by the much more cheaply operated (and privately 
owned) cogs. Even though Ashtor believed that the aggregate value of  the 
cotton traded had declined in the later fifteenth century, because of  a steep 
fall in the price of  Syrian cotton, he estimates that the value of  these cog-
borne cargoes in the later 1490s was about 130,000 to 180,000 ducats a year, 
and thus still a very significant proportion, perhaps as much as 25 percent, of  
the total Venetian trade with the Levant, whose aggregate value thus ‘amounted 
to 580,000-730,000 ducats a year at the end of  the fifteenth century’.40  
That would mean an aggregate value of  value of  the Levantine trade 
(whether measured in imports or exports) amounted, in the weight of  fine 
gold, from 2.056.10 kg to 2,587 kg; or, in terms of  fine silver, if  we use a bi-
metallic ratio of  11:1, from 22,621.10 kg to 28,46.35 kg.41 If  we further as-
sume, as a mean estimate, that European specie accounted for 62.5 percent 
(five-eighths) of  the value of  Asian goods purchased in the Levant, that 
would produce estimates of  Venetian exports of  either of  the following: for 
gold, ranging from 1,285.06 kg to a maximum of  1,617.41 kg; or for silver, 
ranging from 14,135.69 kg to a maximum of  17,191.47 kg. (or some mix of  
the two metals). The estimated amount of  gold exported ranges from 1.705 
to 2.146 times as much gold as minted in England and the Habsburg Low 
Countries combined (i.e., 753.559 kg); and similarly the estimated amount of  
silver exported – if  all the bullion and specie were in silver – ranges from 
1.804 to 2.270 times as much pure silver as was minted in England and the 
Habsburg Low Countries combined (i.e., 7,836.85 kg). These statistical data 
are best appreciated in the summaries presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
                                                     
40 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 476-478 and Table LIV. He also cites an estimate from the 
Mamlūk Sultan Kānsūh al-Ghawri that ‘at the end of  the fifteenth century the Venetians in-
vested 300,000 ducats in cash and 300,000 ducats in merchandise every year in the trade with 
Egypt alone. (p. 478). For other estimates, up to a total investment of  1.1 million ducats in the 
Levantine trade, see: IDEM, The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-Colonialism?, 
in “Journal of  European Economic History”, 3, 1974, 1, pp. 5-53; reprinted in IDEM, Studies on 
Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74); IDEM, Profits from 
Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century, in “Bulletin of  the School of  Oriental and African 
Studies”, 37, 1975, pp. 250-275, reprinted in IDEM, Studies on Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, 
London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74); IDEM, Les métaux précieux et la balance des payements du 
Proche-Orient à la basse-époque, Paris 1971; IDEM, A Social and Economic History, cit.pp. 319-331. 
41 The Venetian gold ducat contained 3.545 g. of  gold, at about 99.48 percent pure. 
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Consider, at the same time, that the minimum mean quinquennial output 
of  the known and documented South German-Central European mines (in 
1496-1500) was 25,759.2 kg fine silver – possibly an underestimate of  one 
third (Table 3). So obviously not all of  that South German silver was flowing 
down the Rhine to the Brabant Fairs; and a very considerable, if  unknown, 
amount continued to go to Venice. Indeed, in supplying South Germany with 
the cotton for its fustian industries the Venetians had, in effect, always ex-
changed it for German silver. The vast increase in silver outputs from these 
mines, from the 1460s, thereby increased the German ability to acquire more 
cotton and, more generally, provided the Venetians with the means of  greatly 
expanding their trade with the Levant and Cyprus, for cotton. According to 
Maureen Mazzaoui, by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Ve-
netians were importing about twice as much cotton (about 4,000 tons or 
about 3,630,000 kg) as they had in the early to mid-fifteenth century.42 That is 
a very, very different question from the traditional view that Venice was ac-
commodating Europe’s short-sighted and greedy demand for spices and 
other Asian luxuries by draining Europe of  its life-blood in precious metals, 
if  we may apply the standard Mercantilist metaphors – or, in the words of  the 
Libelle of  Englysche Polycye (written about 1435-36), ‘as the wasp sucks honey 
from the bee’.43. 
 
Venice and the ‘balance of  payments’ problem with the Levant in the later fifteenth cen-
tury: the role of  silver and the problem of  bimetallic ratios 
In dealing with this Mercantilist ‘problem’, however, we need to find an-
swers to two related questions: why did Europe require so much ‘treasure’ in 
conducting its trade with the Levant, and more generally with Asia; and why was 
such a large proportion in the form of  silver? The typical or standard answer to 
                                                     
42 M. MAZZAOUI, Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 51-52. From the Sarrono firm’s record: an 
estimate of  1,980 tons of  raw cotton per year in the early fifteenth century; from various esti-
mates: about 4,000 tons in the late fifteenth century (2,250 tons from Cyprus and Smyrna); and 
again, citing Frederic Lane, about 4,100 tons in 1560 (13% of  total ship tonnage of  31,564 
tons). See also F LANE, Cotton Cargoes and Regulations against Overloading, in Venice and History, Bal-
timore 1966 (Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 253-262; and IDEM, Venice: A Maritime His-
tory , Baltimore 1973, pp. 480-481. 
43 The Libelle of  Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of  Sea-Power, ed. G WARNER, Oxford 
1926, pp. 21-22, condemning Italian merchants who ‘bere the golde oute of  thys londe, and 
souke the thryfte awey oute of  our honde [hand]; as the waffore [wasp] soukethe honye fro the 
bee, so mynuceth oure commodite [so diminishes our wealth]’. See also G.. HOLMES, The ‘Libel’ 
of  English Policy, in “The English Historical Review”, 76, 1961, pp. 193-216. 
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the first is that many parts of  Asia, from Japan to Persia, or indeed to Egypt in 
the west, had their own highly developed manufacturing industries; and thus 
Europe had little to offer the Asians, at competitive prices. As we shall see, if  
such arguments apply to the later trade of  the Dutch and English East India 
Companies, they do not apply as much to European trade with the Levant. 
Since, however, Asian spices played such a major role in both the Levant 
trade – possibly over 75 percent by value for Venice’s trade – and the later 
East India Company trades (up to the 1670s), we need a more concrete 
measure of  their astonishingly high values, especially in the fifteenth century, 
compared to their values today. The best way of  making that comparison is 
to relate spice prices, then and now, with the purchasing power of  skilled la-
bour: master masons and carpenters, whose occupations have changed little 
over the ensuing centuries (except for twentieth-century mechanization). 
Thus in 1438-49, such building craftsmen could have purchased, with their 
full daily wage (12 hours), only 65.3 grams (0.065 kg) of  cloves in Antwerp 
and 75.6 grams in London; and 241.1 grams of  pepper in Antwerp and 284.6 
grams in London. But in Toronto, in December 2005, a master carpenter 
could have purchased, with his daily wage (8 hours), 6,381.1 grams (6.381kg) 
of  cloves and 12,234.1 grams (12.234 kg) of  pepper.44 Clearly a revolution in 
the spice trade has occurred in the intervening period, but chiefly with the 
nineteenth-century transportation revolutions (i.e., steam shipping). 
The answer to the second major question, concerning the choice of  pre-
cious metals to be exported, is also far more clearly established for eastern 
than for western Asian (Levantine) commerce. The very marked difference in 
bimetallic ratios certainly indicates that silver was generally always scarcer and 
thus relatively more valuable – in terms of  both gold and commodities – in 
eastern Asia than it was in Europe. For example, in both China and Japan, the 
bimetallic ratio during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century was gener-
ally 8:1 or 9:1 – i.e., meaning that a kilogram of  silver was worth as much as 
                                                     
44 Based on data given in H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., I, Appendix 
no. 26:1, pp. no. 309; 26:6, p. 326; 28:2, pp. 351, Synoptic Tables, p. 458; J.E. THOROLD 
ROGERS, A History of  Agriculture and Prices in England, IV, 1401-1582, Oxford 1882, pp. LON-
DON GUILDHALL MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARY: MS 5174, vol. 1; Brewers’ Guild, Warden’s Accounts 
(1424-1562); Corporation of  London Record Office: Bridge Master’s Account Rolls, 1381-
1398; Bridge Master’s Accounts: Weekly Payment Series, 1404-1510 (Vols. I-III); Toronto Car-
penters’ Wages: Carpenters Union, the District Council of  Ontario (whose assistance is grate-
fully acknowledged). 
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1/8th or 0.125 kg of  gold – compared to a bimetallic ratio of  about 11.5:1 in 
western Europe during the early sixteenth century.45  
If  the Europeans had maintained a preference for shipping silver rather 
than gold to the Levant,46 the thin and sometimes conflicting evidence avail-
able on late-medieval bimetallic ratios would seem to justify such a preference 
more in the fourteenth than in the fifteenth, at least according to that sup-
plied by Jere Bacharach.47 His tables for Mamlūk Egypt indicate that the bi-
metallic ratio was generally 9.3:1, from 1313 to 1403, and consistently so from 
1341. Andrew Watson had earlier produced a somewhat similar table for 
Mamlūk Egypt, indicating a low bimetallic ratio of  8.3:1 from 1340-1360, a 
very high and isolated one of  12.4 for 1368-69, and thereafter, a lower ratio 
of  9.6:1, to ca. 1400.48 Spufford, however (and citing neither), has produced a 
table that indicates far higher bimetallic ratios: of  11.3:1 in 1375, 14.7:1 in 
1384, but falling to 12.7:1 in 1399. Those bimetallic mint ratios may be com-
pared to those that he has presented for Venice: widely fluctuating ratios that 
ranged from a high of  14.2:1 in the period 1305-1330, to a low of  9.4:1 in 
1350; but thereafter that ratio rose and hovered about 11:1 into the early fif-
teenth century.49 In Flanders, the bimetallic ratio had also fallen to a similar 
low of  9.68:1, enduring from 1390 to 1418; and in England, the bimetallic ra-
tio had fallen from 11.16:1, one maintained from 1346 to 1412, to one of  
10.33:1,for the ensuing period of  1412 to 1464.50 
                                                     
45 K. YAMAMURA, T. KAMIKI, Silver Mines and Sung Coins: A Monetary History of  Medieval and 
Modern Japan in International Perspective, in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, 
ed. J. RICHARDS, Durham 1983 (Carolina Academic Press), pp. 329-362, Tables 9-10, pp. 345-346. 
46 See E. ASHTOR, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., p. 712 : ‘Insofar as cash payments 
are concerned, it seems that most of  them were made in silver coins, although often it was not 
coined silver, but silver plates’. 
47 Compare J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements in Medieval Egypt, 1171-1517, in Precious 
Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS, Durham N.C. 1983, pp. 
159-182, Table 3, pp. 179-181; citing as well E. ASHTOR, Les métaux précieux et la balance des paye-
ments du Proche-Orient à la basse-époque, Paris 1971. 
48 A. WATSON, Back to Gold -- and Silver, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 20, 1967, 
pp. 1-34, Table 2, p. 27. 
49 P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, cit., Table 7, p. 354; IDEM, Handbook of  Medieval Ex-
change, London 1986 (Royal Historical Society), Table II: Venetian Gold:Silver Ratios, 1305-
1509, p. lxiii. Spufford also cites Ashtor as a source, and another article by Bacharach, but not 
the one cited here, in n. 53. See also A. WATSON, Back to Gold, cit., Table I, pp. 23-25: Silver-
Gold Ratios in Europe, 1100-1400; and S. PAMUK, A Monetary History, cit., pp. 22-26, 43-45 (on 
Egypt and the later 14th-century ‘silver famines’. 
50 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, pp. 148-52. As noted earlier (see p. 923), that 
bimetallic ratio was restored to 11.16:1, with Edward IV’s debasement of  1465. 
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In Mamlūk Egypt, however, during the early fifteenth century – specifi-
cally the years 1403 to 1410 -- the bimetallic ratio had briefly risen to an as-
tonishing high of  14:1: this time, according to all three historians (Bacharach, 
Watson, Spufford). Certainly in this period (and indeed even later), the Vene-
tians were exporting considerable quantities of  gold ducats to the Levant.51 
Then the bimetallic ratio fell very sharply, to reach a temporary low of  7:1 in 
1414, while fluctuating thereafter until the 1430s, when (according to 
Bacharach) it maintained a generally stable level of  10.1 to 10.3:1, over the 
next several decades.52 In 1453, when the famous French merchant-financier 
Jacques Coeur was on trial for violating the ban on bullion exports, accused 
of  having shipped 20,000 silver marcs (weighing 4,895 kg) to Syria, thereby 
having ‘desnué [dénuder] nostre dit pais du Langudeoc’, he admitted that it 
was very profitable to do so, because when silver was worth six gold écus in 
France it was worth seven écus in Syria.53 
Support for that view may be found in the sudden rise of  the bimetallic 
market ratio in the Burgundian Low Countries in the 1440s and 1450s: from 
10.87:1 to 11.98:1.54 Meanwhile, in Venice the bimetallic ratio had also risen: 
                                                     
51 See in particular L.B. ROBBERT, Monetary Flows – Venice, 1150 to 1400, in Precious Metals in 
the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS, Durham North Carolina 1983 
(Carolina Academic Press), pp. 53-78, p. 74, estimating that in the early 1420s, the Venetian 
mints issued 1,200,000 gold ducts and 800,000 ducats worth of  silver coins, of  which ‘Venice 
annually exported 300,000 ducats’ worth to Egypt, to Syria, and to her own Aegean posses-
sions, and to England’; but that estimate in part relies on the questionable validity of  Doge 
Tommaso Mocenigo’s ‘Deathbed Oration’. See A.M. STAHL, Zecca: The Mint of  Venice in the Mid-
dle Ages, Baltimore-London 20000 (The American Numismatic Society-The Johns Hopkins 
University Press), pp. 369-406, esp. p. 406, contending that the supposed current mint produc-
tion ‘of  200,000 gold ducats, and the silver issues [including] 500,000 ducats’ worth of  [silver] 
grossi going to Syria and 100,000 ducats’ worth of  [silver] soldini and mezzanini going to the 
Terrafirma, the Levant, and England respectively... are significantly higher than any we have 
seen throughout the Middle Ages and are certainly in contrast to contemporary characteriza-
tions in legislation of  the gold and silver mints as being “in desolation and reduced to almost 
nothing.” The monetary situation presented in the arenga represents at best the exaggeration of  
a statesman wishing to put the best light on his accomplishments; more probably it results 
from the efforts of  men of  a later age to depict his reign as a “golden age” of  the mint of  
Venice’. (p. 406). 
52 J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements, cit., Table 3, p. 180; P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, 
cit., Table 7, p. 354: giving ratios of  8.1:1 in 1415, 10.7:1 in 1416-21, 7:1 in 1422-24, and 11:1 in 
1425-38 (when his series ends); A. WATSON, Back to Gold, cit., Table 2, p. 27: giving only two 
ratios for Egypt and Syria: 14.1:1 in 1404-05, and 8.0:1 in 1422. 
53 Ibid., pp. 20-21: ‘Il a prouffit a porter argent blanc en Suyrie, car quand il vault 6 escus 
par deca il en valut 7 par dela’: citing archival documents (Département de la Loire), and M. 
MOLLAT, Les affaires de Jacques Coeur: Journal deu Procureur Dawet, Paris 1952. 
54 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, p. 151. 
JOHN MUNRO 928 
from 10:6:1 in 1429 to 11.4:1 in 1449-52, and to a peak of  12:1 in 1445-60.55 
Very shortly thereafter, the European bimetallic ratios began to fall (despite 
the ensuing Central European Silver Mining boom). As noted earlier, the 
Burgundian ratio was reduced to 10.83:1 in 1466-67, reaching a low of  
10.25:1 in 1495; in 1500, it was increased sharply to 11:14:1, while the English 
bimetallic ratio was restored, in 1465, to the former level of  at 11.16:1 (re-
maining at that ratio until 1542).56 In Venice, the ratio fell slightly to 11.91:1 in 
1463 (after which the only recorded ratio is 10:7:1 for 1509).57 In Mamlūk 
Egypt, on the other hand, the bimetallic ratio rose from 10.3 to 11.1:1 in 
1483, and then sharply to 12.5:1 in 1498 – indicating that silver had now be-
come relatively cheaper in the Levant than in western Europe (if  only tempo-
rarily; for the bimetallic ratio recorded for 1507 is a very low 8.5:1).58 What 
metals then predominated in this Levantine trade are obviously difficult to 
determine, but presumably the proportions of  the two metals differed con-
siderably from those of  the later seventeenth-century East India Company 
trades in the Indian Ocean, whose evidence will be examined briefly at the 
end of  this study. 
Another important difference between the Levantine and Indian Ocean 
trades was that the even vaster land mass that came to be incorporated into 
the expanding Ottoman Empire – including all the Mamlūk domains in the 
Levant, after the Ottoman conquests of  1517 – proved to be such a very im-
portant market for European wool-based textiles.59 Indeed, the principal the-
sis advanced in this paper is that such a growth in textile exports led to a 
relative reduction in the quantity of  precious metals that was necessary to 
conduct this trade with the Ottoman Empire. The evidence will show at least 
that the extent of  the ‘balance of  payments’ deficit in European trade with 
the Levant and other zones within the Ottoman Empire was on a far lower 
order of  magnitude than that experienced by the English and the Dutch East 
India companies in their trade with Asia in the seventeenth and early eight-
                                                     
55 P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, cit., Table II, p. lxiii. 
56 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, p. 151. 
57 P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, cit., Table II, p. lxiii. We may assume a bi-
metallic ratio of  about 11:1 in the 1490s. 
58 J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements, cit., Table 3, p. 180. Neither Watson nor Spufford 
provide any mint ratios for Egypt in this period. 
59 Ashtor found that, although the Venetians in the fifteenth century exported large quanti-
ties of  fustians, chiefly Lombard, only rarely are they found in Venetian galley shipments to the 
Levant (but perhaps they would have been shipped in cogs?). See E. ASHTOR, L’exportation de tex-
tiles occidentaux dans le Proche Orient musulman au bas Moyen Age (1370-1517), in Studi in memoria di 
Federigo Melis, cit., II, pp. 303-377. [Volume no. improperly cited in Ashtor’s own bibliography]. 
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eenth centuries. In part, that European commercial success – i.e., in reducing 
the balance of  payments ‘deficit’ – can be explained by very marked differ-
ences in transportation costs, especially for these textiles, with a high 
value:weight ratio. 
 
Transportation and transaction costs in the international textile trade from the later fif-
teenth century 
Thus, any study in the European textile trades with the Levant and the 
Ottoman Empire from the later fifteenth century requires a brief  survey of  
the major macro-economic changes and related changes in transport and 
transaction costs. As Douglass North has demonstrated, the transactions sec-
tor of  the economy is far more subject to and dependent upon scale econo-
mies than any other sector.60 Demography plays a major role in determining 
such scale economies. Indeed, we may contend that the general recovery of  
Europe’s population, after the late-medieval demographic catastrophes, be-
ginning in Italy from about the mid fifteenth century, and in northwestern 
Europe, from the early sixteenth century, aided by the relative diminution in 
warfare (after the end of  the Hundred Years war in 1453), reversed the late-
medieval contractionary forces and thus led to a revival of  the commercial 
structures that had prevailed in the earlier, thirteenth-century ‘Commercial 
Revolution’ era. In so doing, they also produced a very significant reduction 
in transaction costs in international trade: all the more so when that sixteenth-
century population growth was manifested with a disproportionate degree of  
urbanization, thus providing much larger, more concentrated, and more effi-
cient urban markets. 
Those reductions in transaction costs were aided by significant techno-
logical advances in both transportation and communications. In maritime 
commerce, by far the most important was the development, from about the 
1450s, of  the three-masted, fully-rigged and heavily-armed ‘Atlantic’ ships 
(with combined square and lateen sails), especially the carracks and galleons, 
which, according to Frederic Lane led to a 25 percent reduction in shipping 
costs, including implicit insurance costs, with much greater safety, by the early 
                                                     
60 See D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World: A New Economic History, Cam-
bridge 1973, pp. 71-96, 134-138; D. NORTH, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York 
1981, chapters 1-5; IDEM, Government and the Cost of  Exchange in History, in “Journal of  Eco-
nomic History”, 44, 1984, pp. 255-264; D. NORTH, Transaction Costs in History, in “Journal of  
European Economic History”, 14, 1985, pp. 557-576; C.G. REED, Transactions Costs and Differen-
tial Growth in Seventeenth Century Western Europe, in “Journal of  Economic History”, 33, 1973, pp. 
177-190; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, cit., pp. 1-47. 
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sixteenth century: so important for the trade in both cotton and wool. These 
ships allowed Europeans to dominate the world’s shipping lanes for the next 
four centuries.61 Equally important were innovations in overland, continental 
trade: especially, the establishment of  professional, specialized cartage firms, 
which used the new, larger-scale, lower-cost Hesse wagons (carts), in well or-
ganized convoys. These firms offered merchants fully insured passage for 
their goods at predetermined, fixed rates, with reliable travel schedules; and 
they also provided an efficient overland postal service. They soon made the 
continental overland routes both speedier and more reliable than Atlantic 
shipping routes from north-west Europe into the Mediterranean.62 To these 
may be added the subsequent ‘financial revolution’ in the development of  
fully negotiable credit instruments, in both private and public finance (rentes), 
and financial exchanges, from the 1520s, which contributed to a fifty-percent 
                                                     
61 F. LANE, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of  the Renaissance, Baltimore 1934, pp. 26-28; I-
DEM, Technology and Productivity in Seaborne Transportation, in Trasporti e sviluppo econommico, secoli 
XIII-XVIIII, Atti della quinta settimana di studio, Istituto internazationale di storia economica “F. Dati-
ni”, Prato 1973, ed. A. VANNINI MARX, Florence 1986 (Le Monnier, Istituto Internazionale di 
Storia Economica “F. datini”, Atti delle Settimane di Studi e altri convegni, 5), pp. 233-244; 
republished in F. LANE, Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History, B. KOHL, R. MUELLER eds., 
London 1987 (Variorum Reprints); R. UNGER, The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600, Lon-
don-Montreal 1980, pp. 201-250 ; IDEM, Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe, in “Tech-
nology and Culture”, 22, 1981, pp. 233-252; C. CIPOLLA, Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological 
Innovation and the Early Phases of  European Expansion, 1400-1700, New York 1965, pp. 90-131; M. 
ELBL, The Caravel and the Galleon, in Conway's History of  the Ship, III, Cogs, Caravels and Galleons, ed. 
R. GARDINER, London 1994, pp. 91-98, pp. 91-98. See also R. MENARD, Transport Costs and 
Long-Range Trade, 1300-1800: Was There a European ‘Transport Revolution’ in the Early Modern Era?, 
in The Political Economy of  Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750, ed. J. TRACY, 
Cambridge 1991, pp. 228-275. 
62 The chief  hindrance to long-distance maritime commerce was the inability to calculate 
longitude, thus requiring mariners to follow the far longer distance coastal routes. For the evi-
dence on lower transport and transaction costs, see the following: H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  
the Antwerp Market, cit., II, pp. 177-94, 325-364; H. VAN DER WEE, J. MATERNÉ, Antwerp as a 
World Market in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in Antwerp: Story of  a Metropolis, 16th - 17th 
Century, ed. J. VAN DER STOCK, Gent 1993, pp. 19-31; H. VAN DER WEE, Structural Changes, cit., 
pp. 14-33; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, cit., pp. 1-47; W. BRULEZ, L'exportation 
des Pays Bas vers l'Italie par voie de terre au milieu du XVIe siècle, in “Annales: ESC”, 14, 1959, 3, pp. 
461-491; IDEM, The Balance of  Trade, cit., pp. 20-48; IDEM, De firma Della Faille en de internationale 
handel van Vlaamse Firma's in de 16 eeuw, Brussels 1959; F. EDLER, Le commerce d'exportation des 
sayes d'Hondschoote vers Italie d'après la correspondance d'une firme anversoise, entre 1538 et 1544, in “Re-
vue du Nord”, 22, 1936, pp. 249-265. Also to be added are the development of  specialize 
‘commission houses’ in international trade, of  printed daily commercial newspapers, with 
commodity prices and exchange rates, etc. See: J. MCCUSKER, C. GRAVESTEIJN, The Beginnings of  
Commercial and Financial Journalism: The Commodity Price Currents, Exchange Rate Currents, and Money 
Currents of  Early Modern Europe, Amsterdam 1991 (NEHA-Series III). 
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reduction in real interest rates by the mid-sixteenth century, by which time 
interest payments on loans had become fully legal in the Habsburg Nether-
lands (to 12 percent) and in England (to 10 percent).63 
Just as the forces for economic contraction and disruption had so seri-
ously hindered long-distance trade in the cheaper line textiles, by increasing 
transaction costs during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, so the 
reversal of  these forces, and the ensuing fall in transaction costs, in the later 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, promoted a renewed expansion in the inter-
national commerce in such textiles, particularly Geman (and Italian) fustians. 
Following the great success of  the South German fustians was the remark-
able revival of  Hondschoote’s sayetteries and similar Flemish draperies légères. By 
the early to mid sixteenth century, they had displaced both the traditional 
woollen draperies de luxe and the so-called nouvelles draperies to become deci-
sively the leading textile industry of  the southern Low Countries. Most of  
these exported semi-worsted serge cloths: with a long-stapled worsted 
(combed) dry warp and a short-stapled (carded) greased weft. They were far 
lighter and far cheaper than traditional woollen broadcloths, though not as 
cheap and light as pure worsteds. As had been true in the thirteenth century, 
so the major market for the product of  Low Countries’ sayetteries proved to be 
the Mediterranean basin in general, and then the Spanish colonies in the 
Americas.64  
                                                     
63 See H. VAN DER WEE, Anvers et les innovations de la technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe 
siècles, in “Annales ESC”, 22, 1967, pp. 1067-1089, republished as IDEM, Antwerp and the New 
Financial Methods of  the 16th and 17th Centuries, in IDEM, The Low Countries in the Early Modern 
World, trans. by Lizabeth Fackelman, Aldershot 1993 (Variorum Series), pp. 145-166; H. VAN 
DER WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, in The Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, V, 
The Economic Organization of  Early Modern Europe, E.E. RICH, CH. WILSON eds., Cambridge 1977, 
pp. 290-392; J.H. MUNRO, The Medieval Origins, cit., pp. 505-562. 
64 In the 1560s, the production of  woollen cloths from the nouvelles draperies and the very 
few remaining traditional draperies in the southern Low Countries was then about 2.07 million 
metres, while output from the various sayetteries and other draperies légères (sèches) was 3.64 million 
metres, i.e., about 76 percent greater. See H. SOLY, A. THIJS, Nijverheid in de zuidelijke Nederlanden, 
in Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden, I-XII, J.A. VAN HOUTTE, et al. eds., Haarlem 1977-1979, 
6, pp. 27-57, 6, pp. 27-57. See also P. STABEL, Les draperies urbaines en Flandre au XIIIe-XVIe siècles, 
in G.L. FONTANA, G. GAYOT, Wool: Products and Markets (13th-20th Century), Padua 2004 (Libraria 
Editrice Università Padova), pp. 355-380; H. VAN DER WEE, J. MUNRO, The Western European 
Woollen Industries, 1500-1700, in The Cambridge History of  Western Textiles, ed. D. JENKINS, Cam-
bridge-New York 2003, pp. 397-472, 439-458; L. NOORDEGRAAF, The New Draperies in the 
Northern Netherlands, 1500-1800, in The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, 1300-1800, 
ed. N. HARTE, Oxford-New York 1997 (Pasold Studies in Textile History, 10), pp. 173-195, 
217-244, 245-274. 
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Subsequently, as will be noted, this Flemish industry suffered a severe 
blow with the Revolt of  the Netherlands against Spanish rule, from 1568 to 
1609, when so many textile artisans fled Flanders to seek refuge both in Hol-
land and in England (East Anglia), introducing in both regions the so-called 
‘New Draperies’.65 In England itself, the subsequent rapid expansion of  the 
New Draperies took place when the Old Draperies, producing the traditional, 
fine quality, heavy-weight woollens, were beginning to decline; and those 
changes represent by far the most important industrial transformations in 
Tudor- Stuart England.  
Both phenomena, though chiefly resulting on the demand side from 
structural changes in international trade, were also the consequences, on the 
supply side, by the contemporary Tudor-Stuart enclosure movement. Because 
of  both selective breeding to produce bigger sheep for urban meat markets 
and improved livestock feeding techniques, much of  England’s wool produc-
tion ultimately underwent a remarkable transformation: from being predomi-
nantly very fine, short fibred wools (from small sheep with sparse pastures) to 
becoming much longer-stapled, coarser, strong wools (from large, well-fed 
sheep). That meant that most English wools, by the seventeenth century, had 
become more suitable for the production of  long-stapled worsteds than for 
short-stapled fine woollens.66 The role of  both sets of  English draperies in 
Mediterranean and Venetian trade, especially with the Ottoman Empire, dur-
ing the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, will be the penultimate ob-
ject of  this study, which first, however, requires an examination of  Venice’s 
woollen cloth production and trade. 
 
The rise of  Venetian cloth production in the sixteenth century: warfare and the Sella thesis 
The apparently sudden rise and very rapid expansion of  the Venetian 
woollen cloth industry during the early and mid sixteenth century, and then 
its equally rapid decline in the seventeenth century, is certainly one of  the 
very most fascinating events in the history of  early-modern Mediterranean 
trade, and especially the trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire. In the 
                                                     
65 See sources in the previous note; and see also below, pp. 945-952. 
66 Note that the staple length and quality of  wools are together functions of  the size of  
the sheep: from both breeding and sheep management. P. BOWDEN, The Wool Supply and the 
Woollen Industry, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 9, 1956-57, pp. 44-58; IDEM, The Wool 
Trade in Tudor and Stuart England, London 1962, pp. 1-76; H. VAN DER WEE, J. MUNRO, The West-
ern European Woollen Industries, cit., pp. 423-425, 452-461; J.H. MUNRO, Spanish Merino Wools and 
the Nouvelles Draperies: an Industrial Transformation in the Late-Medieval Low Countries, in “Eco-
nomic History Review”, 2nd ser., 58, 2005, 3, pp. 431-484; and the sources in n. 63. 
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English-speaking world certainly by far the best known history of  this Ve-
netian cloth industry was that written by the Italian-born scholar, Domenico 
Sella.67 Thanks to his own research, and to that of  several other Italian schol-
ars, we now possess a remarkable annual series of  Venetian woollen cloth 
outputs from the early sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries (Table 5).68  
Sella’s basic thesis, to explain the rise of  the Venetian cloth industry, again 
concerns the impact of  warfare, from Charles VIII’s French invasion in 1494 
to the peace finally established in 1559 by the Treaty of  Cateau-Cambrésis. 
He contended that Venice, so well protected and isolated in its lagoon setting, 
took advantage of  the devastation that the various French, Imperial, and 
Spanish invasions wrecked upon the previously predominant woollen indus-
tries, above all in Florence, but also in several other Tuscan and Lombard 
towns. Venice had never before maintained a cloth industry of  any great in-
ternational importance. In the later medieval era, its own small textile industry 
had specialized in manufacturing very costly, ultra-luxury woollens, especially 
scarlets, woven from the finest English wools. Sella contends that in the fif-
teenth century, its ‘annual output never rose, so far as is known, beyond 3,000 
cloths’, an amount he compares to Venetian purchases and re-exports of  
some 48,000 cloths ca. 1420.69 Thus, in Sella’s view, these sixteenth-century 
                                                     
67 D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the Venetian Woollen Industry, in Crisis and Change in the Venetian 
Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. B. PULLAN, London 1968, pp. 106-126; trans-
lated by the author, in a revised and expanded form, from D. SELLA, Les mouvements longs de l'in-
dustrie lainière à Venise, in “Annales: ESC”, 12, 1957, pp. 29-45. See also IDEM, Commerci e industrie 
a Venezia nel secolo XVII, Venice-Rome 1961; D. SELLA, Crisis and Transformation in Venetian Trade, 
in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. B. PULLAN, 
London 1968, pp. 88-105; translated by the author, also in a revised and expanded form, from 
D. SELLA, Il declino dell'emporio realtino, in La civiltà veneziana nell'età barocca, Venice 1959. 
68 The sixteenth-century statistics (1516-1605) were first published in P. SARDELLA, 
L’Épanouissement industriel de Venise au XVIe siècle: Un beau texte inédit, in “Annales ESC”, 2, 1947, 
3 , pp. 195-196; the rest of  the data, to 1713, were published in D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the 
Venetian Woollen Industry, cit., pp. 29-45. However, this still very well known series contains a 
number of  statistical errors, which have now been largely corrected in: W. PANCIERA, L’Arte 
matrice: I lanifici della Repubblica di Venezia nei secoli XVII e XVIII, Treviso 1996 (Fondazione 
Benetton Studi Ricerche-Canova Editrice, Studi veneti, 5), Table 2, pp. 42-43, which also ex-
tends Sella’s series from 1713 to 1723. I wish to offer my sincere thanks to Professor Panciera, 
who sent me a photo-copy of  the document from the Venetian archives (ASCW, Cinque savi b. 
476) containing the original data. Unfortunately, in using this archival document, I found it 
necessary to correct his statistics for the following four years: 1521, 1618, 1639, and 1662. 
69 According to D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the Venetian Woollen Industry, cit., p. 111: ‘The 
Venetian woollen industry, whose origins go back to the thirteenth century, remained a neglible 
part of  the city’s economy until the great upsurge of  the sixteenth centuries’, citing in particular 
N. FANO, Richerche sull’arte della lana a Venezia nel XIII e XIV secolo, in “Archivio Veneto”, 1936, 
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wars allowed Venice to replace all other Italian cities to become the over-
whelmingly decisive leader in exporting fine woollen cloths, especially to the 
Ottoman Empire (including the Levant, from 1517).  
That thesis unfortunately ignores the damages that Venice herself  suf-
fered during some of  these wars, indeed in narrowly escaping total annihila-
tion – in the greatest threat to its existence since the Battle of  Chioggia 
(1381).70 First, in 1508, Venice faced a seemingly invincible coalition of  very 
hostile and very formidable enemies: the Holy Roman Emperor (Maximilian), 
France (Louis XII), the Papacy (Pope Julius II), and the King of  Hungary, 
who had formed an alliance by the Treaty of  Cambrai, with the objective of  
recapturing or seizing Venice’s recent Italian acquisitions, outside her tradi-
tional her traditional ‘Venetia’ jurisdiction. In May 1509, the French- led army, 
at the Battle of  Agnadello (on the Adda), utterly defeated the Venetians, who 
were forced to abandon the entire mainland. Although this coalition soon 
dissolved, rent by conflicting rivalries, Venice – now stripped of  her papal ter-
ritories – found herself  again at war with the French, who again defeated the 
Venetians, at the Battle of  Marignano, in September 1513. But, fortunately 
Venice was spared further losses by the 1516 Concordat of  Bologna in 1516. 
These wars may explain why the very first recorded output, in that same year 
– just 1,310 pieces in 1516 – was so very small. 
 
The Ottoman and Portuguese threats to Venetian prosperity in the Levant Trade 
Furthermore, Venice had already been severely threatened – in both mili-
tary but especially in commercial terms – by a conjunction of  other seeming 
disasters at the hands of  the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese. First, as is 
so well known, the Ottoman Turks, under Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481), 
had finally vanquished the remnants of  the old Byzantine Empire, in seizing 
Constantinople in 1453, where Venice had long maintained important com-
mercial privileges. He then completed the conquest of  Serbia (1459) and 
seized the Morea (1459), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463-64), the southern 
Crimea (1475), and northern Albania (1478-79). During these later conquests, 
from 1463 to 1479, the Turks were also at war with Venice, seizing in particu-
lar, in 1470, the vitally important Aegean island of  Euboea (Évvoia, also 
                                                                                                                         
pp. 72-212. For the nature and costs of  scarlets, see J.H. MUNRO, The Medieval Scarlet and the Eco-
nomics of  Sartorial Splendour, in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe, cit., pp. 13-70. 
70 See D. SELLA, Rise and Fall, cit., pp.  113-115; A. GRANT, History of  Europe from 1494 to 
1610, New York 19515, pp.  52-54, 65-69; F. LANE, Venice: A Maritime Republic, Baltimore-
London 1973, pp.  242-245. 
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known as Negropont); but the Venetians partially compensated for that loss 
by gradually annexing Cyprus (1473-89). 
The next Ottoman Sultan, Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), struck much more 
disastrous blows against Venice: first in injuring its Levant trade in wars with 
the Mamlūks, in 1485-91, and then, more seriously, by inflicting a decisive de-
feat on the Venetian navy at the Battle of  Zonchio in 1499, which led to the 
Turkish conquest of  most of  the Venetian strongholds in southern Greece 
and many others along the Dalmatian coast. In 1503, a greatly weakened Ven-
ice was forced to sign a peace treaty that ceded more of  Greece and the Dal-
matian coast (Albania) to the Ottoman Empire, events that Frederic Lane 
contended produced the ‘turning point of  Venetian history’. Worse was still 
yet to come. In 1514, the next Ottoman Sultan, Selim I (r. 1512-20), launched 
an assault on Safavid Persia (1501-1736) and then, with much greater success, 
in 1516-1517, he subjugated the Sherrif  of  Mecca’s Arabian domains and 
conquered the Mamlūk domains in Egypt, Palestine and Syria (i.e., the Le-
vant). Next to fall to the Turks were Rhodes, in 1522, and Algiers, in 1529, 
conquests that thus allowed the Ottoman Empire to encircle ‘the whole 
Mediterranean Sea from Albania to Morocco’.71 Surely the Venetians could not 
have entertained any hopes of  gaining from the hostile Turks the previous 
commercial privileges that they had so long enjoyed in the Mamlūk domains. 
Even before these events, of  course, Portugal had already established its 
direct sea route to the East Indies, in 1499-1500, and in 1501 King Manuel I 
established Portugal’s official European staple for Asian spices at Antwerp, 
where Portuguese merchants sought the necessary commodities with which 
to buy those Asian spices: namely, South German silver and also copper – 
similarly scarce in Asia (except in Japan); and of  course they also sought there 
the financial services of  the Fuggers, Welsers, Hochstetters, and other South 
German merchant banking firms.72 From 1496 to 1502, Venetian spice pur-
chases at Alexandria and Beirut fell by 75 percent; and from 1504 to 1515, 
there were virtually no purchases at Alexandria, and few at Beirut. Indeed in 
1513, only 314,000 lb. of  Asian spices entered Beirut, compared to 4,256,000 
lb (1,930,488 kg) that arrived in Europe via Lisbon.73  
                                                     
71 See Ibid., pp. 245-249; H. INALCIK, An Economic and Social History of  the Ottoman Empire, 
I-II, Cambridge 1994, I, 1300-1600, pp. 15-22, 193-195; F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of  Philip II, translated by Sian Reynolds, I-II, London-New York 
1972-73, II, pp. 661-669. 
72 See H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, 113-44 ; J.H. MUNRO, The 
Monetary Origins, cit., pp. 1-34. 
73 H. INALCIK, An Economic and Social History, cit., I, pp. 340-342, and Table I, p. 68 (in lb., 
whose weight is not specified). 
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Did the Portuguese therefore succeed in diverting much more of  that sil-
ver away from Venetian commerce to the Antwerp market? In the absence of  
direct evidence on silver flows, we can cite some very striking statistics on the 
Fugger House’s exports of  Hungarian copper in these years (Table 4): the 
share going to Venice fell from 32.1 percent in 1499-1501 to just 0.29 percent 
in 1516-17 (5.16 percent in 1526-30), while the share going to Antwerp rose 
from 5.22 percent in 1496-1500 to 62.5 percent in 1514-15 (58.4 percent in 
1511-15; 58.85 percent in 1526-30).74 
In view of  all these wars and commercial disasters, the subsequent rise of  
the Venetian woollen cloth industry seems all the more remarkable. But let us 
admit at the outset that the Ottoman Turkish and Portuguese threats to Ve-
netian commerce and prosperity were, in fact, ephemeral. Indeed, once again, 
to use the trite phrase, Venice snatched victory from the jaws of  defeat. As is 
now so well known, the Portuguese control of  the East Indies spice trades 
and of  the Indian Ocean shipping lanes, despite superior naval power, with 
their heavily gunned carracks, was at best tenuous. From the 1530s, the Por-
tuguese were no longer able to control the Straits of  Malacca or to prevent 
the rapid rise of  a rival commercial power in North Sumatra: the sultanate of  
Aceh (Atjeh), which, with Ottoman support, defeated the Portuguese fleet in 
1537. Nor did the Portuguese succeed in controlling the port that governed 
access to the Red Sea: Aden, which also fell to the Ottoman Turks, in 1538. 
Subsequently a Muslim alliance of  Aceh, Gujerat (in NW India), and the Ot-
toman Turks succeeded in supplying a steady flow of  spices via the Persian 
Gulf  routes (despite Portuguese control of  Hormuz) and the Red Sea routes, 
via Jedda, which thus reached the Mediterranean ports of  Alexandria, Beirut, 
and Aleppo, allowing the Venetians to regain control over half  of  the spice 
trade -- certainly from the 1550s.75 Obviously Turkish control of  all these 
ports did not provide the expected impediment to Venetian commerce; in-
deed, as early as the 1503 peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, the Vene-
                                                     
74 H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., I, pp. 522-523, Appendix 44:1; J.H. 
MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., Table 1.7, p. 26. For the Levantine copper trade, see also M. 
DENZEL, Metalle im Levantehandel im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert: Forschungsstand und Forschungsfragen, in 
Der Tiroler Bergbau und die Depression der europäischen Montanwirtschaft im 14.  und 15.  Jahrhundert, R. 
TASSER, E. WESTERMANN, G. PFEIFER eds., Munich-Vienna 2005 (Studien Verlag, Akten der 
internationalen bergbaugeschichtlichen Tagung Steinhaus), pp. 45-60. 
75 H. INALCIK, An Economic and Social History, cit., I, pp. 327-359, contending that this Mus-
lim alliance achieved its greatest successes against the Portuguese from c.1560 to 1580, or fol-
lowing the Ottoman naval defeat in the Persian Gulf, in 1554. He also notes that the first major 
pepper shipments from Atjeh (Aceh) had arrived in the Red Sea as early as 1530. Gujerat was 
an independent Muslim sultanate (with a large Hindu population) from 1401 until 1576, it was 
annexed to the Moghul (Mughal) Empire, under Akbar the Great (r. 1556-1605). 
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tians had recognized that their only hope of  regaining a major share of  the 
Asian spice trades lay in co-operation with the Ottomans, in opposing the 
Portuguese.76  
 
The (temporary) decline of  the Florentine and the rise of  the Venetian woollen industry: 
the Chorley Thesis 
The role of  the Ottomans in the Venetian textile trades in the sixteenth 
century now requires closer examination. More recently, Patrick Chorley has 
offered an entirely different and, in my view, far more convincing explanation 
for the rise of  the sixteenth-century Venetian cloth industry, in terms of  gen-
erally very different problems that were plaguing the previously leading textile 
manufacturer: Florence, and specifically its own relations with the Ottoman 
Empire. First, Chorley demonstrated that the Florentine woollen industry 
reached its apogee a full three decades after Charles VIII’s 1494 invasion: in 
the late 1520s, with an output of  about 20,000 pieces, perhaps double that of  
a century earlier. Of  this industry’s two sections, the much older, more tradi-
tional San Martino branch produced about 4,000 to 5,000 very fine and very 
costly woollens that were still made uniquely from the finest English wools. 
The other newer Garbo branch also produced genuine woollens, but manu-
factured them from a wide variety of  wools: domestic Italian (lana matricina, 
from the Abruzzi region), Provençal, Majorcan, and, with increasing impor-
tance Spanish merino wools.77 For reasons that I have recently explored else-
where, these merino wools were now rivalling all but the very finest English 
wools in quality, while selling for a much lower price.78 Since wools were al-
ways the prime cost component in textile production, the panni di Garbo sold 
for far lower prices than did the San Martino woollens. According to Chor-
ley’s estimate, the Garbo branch of  the industry, in the 1520s, was accounting 
                                                     
76 H. INALCIK, An Economic and Social History, cit., I, p. 344. For Genoa’s commercial rela-
tions with the Ottoman Empire, see K. FLEET, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman 
State: the Merchants of  Genoa and Turkey, Cambridge-New York 1999 (Cambridge Studies in Is-
lamic Civilization, Cambridge University Press), and for the cloth trade, see pp 95-111. 
77 P. CHORLEY, Rascie and the Florentine Cloth Industry during the Sixteenth Century, in “The 
Journal of  European Economic History”, 32, 2003, 3, pp. 487-526, in particular, pp. 487-489, 
and Appendix One, pp. 515-19; and also IDEM, The Volume of  Cloth Production in Florence, 1500-
1650: An Assessment of  the Evidence, in G.L. FONTANA, G. GAYOT, Wool: Products and Markets, cit., 
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Commercial Development of  Ancona, 1479-1551, “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 22:1, 1969, 
pp. 28-44. 
78 J.H. MUNRO, Spanish Merino Wools, cit., pp. 431-84. See n. 66 above. 
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for 75 percent of  the total production, i.e., about 15,000 woollens, but for 
only 50 percent of  the total value of  sales, estimated to have been about 
600,000 florins (with the same value as Venetian ducats).79  
Both branches of  the Florentine cloth industry, but especially the Garbo, 
had enjoyed a very considerable success in Levantine markets during the later 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.80 The fact that the Italians had been so 
successful in marketing not only their own but other European woollens in 
the Levant is hardly evidence of  any Mamlūk ‘industrial decline’, as Ashtor 
has so frequently argued.81 Textile consumption is and always has been, of  
course, universal, and its production virtually so, in thousands of  specific va-
rieties, ranging from the very coarsest and cheapest to the very finest and ul-
tra-luxurious (as in woollen scarlets and silks), in a seamless continuum of  
values and prices.82 In medieval and early modern Europe, any given country 
or region produced several varieties of  textiles to serve its own domestic and 
also some foreign markets, in terms of  specific types and market niches, 
while importing those varieties for which it had no comparative advantage in 
production. The specific advantages of  English, Flemish, Dutch, Catalan, and 
Italian woollen cloth industries, in the later medieval and early modern eras, 
was their use of  the world’s finest wools: first the English, and then, from the 
sixteenth century, Spanish merino wools, whose quality and fineness were 
vastly superior to those wools available in the Islamic world (but not, of  
                                                     
79 P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., pp. 487-526, in particular, pp. 487-89, and Appendix One, 
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HOSHINO, Industria tessile e commercio internazionale nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo, F. FRANCESCHI, 
S. TOGNETTI eds., Florence 2001 (Leo S. Olschki). 
81 See E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 433-512; IDEM, A Social and Economic History, cit., 
pp. 301-31 (esp. p. 329: ‘The slow decay of  Egyptian industry and the dumping of  European 
and Far Eastern products certainly played their part in this [Mamluk] collapse’); E. ASHTOR, 
L’Apogée du commerce Vénitien au Levant: un nouvel essai d’explication, in Venezia centro di mediazione 
tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e probelemi, Atti dell II Convegno Internazionale di 
Storia della Civiltà Veneziana, I, Florence 1977, pp. 307-326; reprinted in IDEM, Technology, In-
dustry and Trade: the Levant versus Europe, 1250-1500, ed. B.Z. KEDAR, Hampshire 1992 (Vari-
orum Collected Studies Series CS372), esp. p. 319: ‘L’importation des draps occidentaux 
revêtait à la fin du XIVe siècle et au début du XVe siècle le caractère d’un véritable dumping’); 
IDEM, The Economic Decline of  the Middle East during the Later Middle Ages: an Outline, in “Asian and 
African Studies”, 15, 1981, pp. 253-286; reprinted in IDEM, Technology, Industry and Trade, cit.; 
and also IDEM, Studies on the Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Col-
lected Studies CS74). See also IDEM, L’exportation de textiles, cit., pp. 303-377, cited in n. 72 
above. 
82 See J.H. MUNRO, The Medieval Scarlet, cit., pp. 13-70. 
A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH 939
course, to the cottons and silks). Trade is not a Mercantilist zero-sum game, 
in which the victors gain by imposing their goods on the losers. Trade serves 
to satisfy mutual and differing wants, in order to benefit both sides, indeed in 
what Classical Economists called ‘the gains of  trade’, from the ‘law of  com-
parative advantage’. Ashtor’s charge of  ‘dumping’ is, furthermore, absolutely 
absurd, because abundant evidence of  cloth sales in Alexandria and Beirut 
indicate that the prices are equivalent (with added transport and transaction 
costs) to prices in the home countries of  the sellers.83 
To explain the sudden decline of  the traditional Florentine woollen indus-
tries, and the subsequent expansion of  the Venetian, from ca. 1530, Chorley 
cites two major factors. The first, and most important, was the Florentine loss 
of  its dominance in those Levantine markets, beginning with a ‘disruption in 
the trade in Iranian [raw] silk’ from an embargo that the Ottoman Sultan 
Selim I had imposed in the years 1514-20, leading to a shift in the silk transit 
trade from Bursa (Constantinople) to Aleppo, where the Florentines ‘had no 
established presence’, but the Venetians certainly did — from the spice trade. 
For some Florentine firms, the Ottoman Turkish share of  their exports fell 
from a high of  42 percent, in 1518-32, to 13 percent in 1544. The second was 
Florence’s own internal crisis of  the years 1526-30, when bubonic plague 
killed perhaps a quarter of  the population. At almost the same time, the 
Spanish-German sack of  Rome in 1527, threatening the expulsion of  the 
Medici Pope Clement VII, led to a revolution against Medici rule in Florence, 
which was finally and brutally crushed by Papal forces in August 1530.84 
 
                                                     
83 See comparative values of  wools and textiles, with prices for Europe, the Byzantine 
Empire, and the Mamlūk domains: in IDEM, Wool Price Schedules and the Qualities of  English Wools 
in the Later Middle Ages, in “Textile History”, 9, 1978, pp. 118-169; IDEM, Industrial Transforma-
tions in the North-West European Textile Trades, c. 1290-c. 1340: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis? 
in Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of  the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B.M.S. CAMPBELL, 
Manchester-New York 1991 (Manchester University Press), pp. 110-148; IDEM, The Origins of  
the English ‘New Draperies’: The Resurrection of  an Old Flemish Industry, 1270-1570, in The New Drap-
eries in the Low Countries and England, 1300-1800, ed. N. HARTE, Oxford-New York, 1997 (Pasold 
Studies in Textile History, 10), pp. 35-127; IDEM, The Medieval Scarlet, cit., pp. 13-70; IDEM, Me-
dieval Woollens, cit., pp. 181-227; IDEM, Spanish Merino Wools, cit., pp. 431-484. 
84 P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., pp. 487-491; A.J. GRANT, History of  Europe from 1494 to 1610, 
New York 1951, pp. 136-142, 204-205. See also P. EARLE, Commercial Development of  Ancona, cit., 
p. 37, for further evidence on the sharp decline of  Florentine cloth sales, from the 1520s, and 
the growing influx of  English woollens (Winchcombe kerseys, panni di Londra, and ultrafini – 
probably Suffolk ultrafine broadcloths). 
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Venetian cloth production and exports in the sixteenth Century 
In the light of  all the foregoing historical evidence, and of  the circum-
stances just analysed, we may now better appreciate the significance of  the 
(corrected) statistics on Venetian cloth production, from 1516 to 1723 (Table 
5). From that earliest recorded output, production grew from a mere 1,310 
pieces to reach its first peak in 1569, with 26,541 pieces.85 If, however, we 
look at these production statistics in terms of  quinquennial means, we find 
that mean annual production did not exceed 10,000 pieces until 1546-50; and 
the much more rapid growth of  output from the mid-1540s (to the late 
1560s) may be related to Venice’s ability to regain a significant share of  the 
Asian spice trade, via Ottoman ports: i.e., in effect exchanging woollens for at 
least some spices.  
From evidence on cloth widths these appear to be genuine heavy-weight 
woollen broadcloths: 1.80 metres compared to 1.60 metres for the English. 
Such woollens were now, evidently, manufactured chiefly from Spanish merino 
wools (i.e., substituted for the finer English wools); but the production statis-
tics evidently also cover a wide range of  textiles, some made from Italian or 
other wools. From the 1550s, according to Panciera, Venice began manufac-
turing cloths of  the ‘light draperies’, in imitation of  the Flemish Hond-
schoote says, also made from a worsted warp and woollen weft, which were 
also exported chiefly to the Levant.86  
For the peak period of  mid-sixteenth century production, in 1566-70, 
quinquennial mean production was 18,513.20 woollen cloths; but production 
had in fact slumped sharply in the year 1570 – at the time of  the Ottoman 
seizure of  Cyprus and then the Ottoman defeat at maritime Battle of  Lep-
anto – to just 9,462 pieces. Cloth production then recovered, but with a 
slower rate of  annual growth than before the 1560s, and with a series of  of-
ten severe oscillations. That diminished growth rate may reflect the revival of  
Lombard and Tuscan cloth production, after the 1559 Peace of  Cateau-
Cambrésis; for we do know that Florence, also selling woollens in Levantine 
markets, had more than doubled its production after 1558: from 16,000 
pieces to about 33,000 pieces in 1561.87 Venetian cloth production itself  
                                                     
85 See n. 68 above and Table 5 for the Venetian cloth production statistics. 
86 W. PANCIERA, Qualità e costi di produzione nei lanifici veneti (secoli XVI-XVIII), in Wool: Pro-
ducts and Markets (13th - 20th Century), G. L. FONTANA, G. GAYOT eds., Padua 2004 (Libraria Edi-
trice Università Padova), pp. 420-22, 429-31 (Tables 1-2); IDEM, L’Arte Matrice, cit., pp.  39-51. 
87 See P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., Table 1, p. 516: in panni corsivi; IDEM, The Volume of  Cloth 
Production, cit., Table 1, p. 556, noting that while production had fallen to 28,492 panni corsivi in 
or by 1570, it then rose to 33,212 panni in 1571 (when Venetian production had slumped to just 
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reached its ultimate peak, of  28,728 pieces, in 1602 – or with a quinquennial 
mean production of  23,572.80 pieces in 1601-05. Production then followed a 
steep downward curve, with some oscillations: to 23,000 pieces in 1620, to 
13,275 pieces in 1630, to 10,082 pieces in 1650, to just 5,226 pieces in 1670, to 
2,033 pieces in 1700, and then to 1,689 pieces, when the series ends in 1723. 88 
 
The decline and fall of  Venetian cloth production in the seventeenth century: the tradi-
tional views 
The subsequent seventeenth-century slump and then virtual collapse of  
the Venetian cloth industry (and of  the Florentine and other Italian woollen 
industries) has traditionally been attributed essentially to internal factors. The 
most important, according to a litany of  faults set forth by Sella himself, 
Carlo Cipolla, Brian Pullan, Fernand Braudel, was this industry’s ‘failure both 
to lower prices and to innovate’. That in turn supposedly reflects the roles of  
rigid guild restrictions, strictly enforced by the city government, excessive 
taxation, and, of  course, the payment of  ‘high wages’, another inevitable deus 
ex machina argument for industrial decline.89  
                                                                                                                         
9,492 pieces). We also know that the primary overseas market for the Medici firm’s woollen 
cloths was the Levant. R. DE ROOVER, A Florentine Firm, cit., p. 101. See also H. VAN DER WEE, 
J. MUNRO, The Western European Woollen Industries, cit., pp. 407-409, 425-427. See also P. MA-
LANIMA, An Example of  Industrial Reconversion: Tuscany in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in 
The Rise and Decline of  Urban Industries in Italy and the Low Countries (Late Middle Ages – Early Mod-
ern Times), ed. H. VAN DER WEE, Leuven 1988 (Leuven University Press), pp. 63-74; and also H. 
VAN DER WEE, J. MUNRO, The Western European Woollen Industries, cit., pp. 407-408, 425-427. 
88 See note 68 and Table 5 for the statistics.  
89 D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the Venetian Woollen Industry, cit., pp. 106-126 (quotations on pp. 
120-121); D. SELLA, Crisis and Transformation, cit., pp. 88-105; C.M. CIPOLLA, The Economic Decline 
of  Italy, in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. B. 
PULLAN, London 1968, pp. 127-145 [Translated by Janet Pullan from C.M. CIPOLLA, Il declino 
economico dell’Italia, in Storia dell'economica italiana, Turin 1959 (Boringhiere), which in turn was a 
revised and expanded version of  IDEM, The Decline of  Italy: the Case of  a Fully Matured Economy, 
in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 5, 1952, pp. 178-187; B. PULLAN, Wage Earners and the 
Venetian Economy, 1550-1630, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 16, 1964, 3, pp. 407-426; 
reprinted in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. 
IDEM, London 1968, pp. 146-174; F. BRAUDEL, P. JEANNIN, J. MEUVRET, R. ROMANO, Le déclin de 
Venise au XVIIe siècle, in Aspetti e cause della decadenza veneziana nel secolo XVII: Atti del convegno 27 
giugno-2 luglio 1957, Venezia, Venice-Rome 1961, pp. 22-85; R. RAPP, The Unmaking of  the Mediter-
ranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution, in “Journal of  
Economic History”, 35, 1975, pp. 499-525; R. RAPP, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth-
Century Venice, Cambridge 1976; R. DAVIS, England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670, in Essays in 
the Economic and Social History of  Tudor and Stuart England, ed. F.J. FISHER, London 1961, pp. 117-
137. For a good and fair survey, see S. CIRIACONO, Mass Consumption Goods and Luxury Goods: the 
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Because the Venetians lost much of  their Ottoman markets to the Eng-
lish cloth trade, during the seventeenth century, the ‘faults’ of  the Venetian 
industry are then contrasted with the supposedly lower-cost ‘virtues’ of  the 
English woollen cloth industry. We have no way of  comparing labour costs in 
the two industries; but most economists take a dim view of  the all-too-
common ‘high wage’ argument. If  high living costs and high taxes may be 
factors in explaining high wages (as, for example, in the eighteenth-century 
Dutch Republic), nevertheless ‘high wages’ can be justified and maintained 
only if  and when they equal the marginal revenue product of  labour: i.e., the 
market value of  the last unit of  the commodity produced by the last worker 
hired. Certainly labour productivity can and did vary enormously; and gener-
ally low rural wages or low money-wage rates – a supposed advantage of  the 
largely rural or small-town English woollen cloth industry – are explained by 
a productivity, set of  skills, and education that were substantially inferior to 
that found in early-modern towns, which generally also enjoyed lower trans-
action costs in organising labour. 
Nor can it be proved that guild regulations, especially when chiefly de-
signed to ensure quality controls in manufacturing industries subject to ‘price-
making’ monopolistic-competition structures, are necessarily injurious to an 
industry’s fortunes. On the contrary, for luxury or fine cloth production, qual-
ity considerations (affecting the slope of  the demand curve in that monopo-
listic competition) were generally a more important consideration than costs 
and prices; and thus guild regulations can be fully justified to ensure the qual-
ity controls and hence the industry’s reputation and market shares in foreign 
lands.90 Let us remember such guilds did not hinder the rise and expansion of  
the Flemish, Florentine, and indeed the Venetian cloth industries. Further-
more, the extent to which the English woollen cloth industry had, by the mid 
                                                                                                                         
De-Industrializaton of  the Republic of  Venice from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, in The Rise and 
Decline of  Urban Industries, cit., pp.  41-61.  He notes the importance of  plague in the 1630s, for 
industrial decline. 
90 See in particular these arguments in J. MUNRO, Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competi-
tion in the Textile Industries of  the Late-Medieval Low Countries, in Textiles of  the Low Countries in 
European Economic History. Proceedings of  10th International Economic History Congress, E. AERTS, J. 
MUNRO eds., Leuven 1990 (Studies in Social and Economic History, 19), pp. 41-52; reprinted in 
J. MUNRO, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of  Late-Medieval England and the 
Low Countries, London 1994 (Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442); IDEM, The Symbiosis of  
Towns and Textiles, cit.,. For Venice itself, and the same role of  guilds in the silk industry, see L. 
MOLÀ, The Silk Industry of  Renaissance Venice, Baltimore-London (The Johns Hopkins University 
Press), pp. 55-160. 
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sixteenth century, become subject to Parliamentary legislation and regulation 
is often overlooked. 91 
Did the English, however, still enjoy a significant advantage in their wool 
supplies, as they had in the fifteenth century: a vital consideration when wools 
were so very important as the prime component of  pre-finishing manufactur-
ing costs and as the prime determinant of  textile quality?92 The answer this 
time, for the seventeenth century, is decisively no: in terms, at least, of  the 
higher-valued, heavy-weight woollens. For, as noted earlier, England’s primacy 
in fine quality-wool production had now been decisively lost to Spanish merino 
wools: so much so that England was now importing substantial quantities of  
Spanish wools in order to produce, as a mixture with some of  the best and 
few remaining high quality March wools, what were known as ‘Spanish med-
leys’, or ‘superfine’ broadcloths. Since the Venetian industry was also using 
Spanish merino wools, and since the transportation and merchandising costs in 
acquiring these Spanish wools were lower than those incurred by the far dis-
tant English industry, the Venetians should have enjoyed that cost advantage. 
In any event, no conceivable set of  changes affecting Venetian productivity 
can possibly explain an industrial decline that was so sudden, so precipitous, 
and so very steep.  
 
The role of  England’s Levant Company: English textile exports to the Ottoman Empire, 
and the decline of  the Venetian woollen cloth industry, 1580-1720 
The true advantage that the English did enjoy, dating from the later six-
teenth century, was – as the Venetian advantage had once been – far more 
commercial than purely industrial. That commercial advantage had two pri-
mary components: institutional- diplomatic, in the form of  the new Levant 
Company, and a superior naval technology. The explanation of  the first re-
quires a brief  history of  the most important event in Ottoman-European re-
lations in the later sixteenth century. In 1570-71, the Ottoman Sultan Selim II 
succeeded in seizing Cyprus, and thus control of  the Aegean Sea, from Ven-
ice, with a resulting massacre that horrified Christian Europe. The Papacy 
                                                     
91 See Great Britain, Record Commission (T.E. TOMLINS, J. RAITHBY, et. al, eds.), Statutes 
of  the Realm, I-VI, London,1810-22, IV:i, pp. 136-137 (5-6 Edwardi VI, cap. 6, pt. 1); 
G. RAMSAY, The Wiltshire Woollen Industry in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, London 1943; 
2nd ed. 1965). 
92 See above, pp. 921-922 and nn. 31-32 . For relative wool costs, as a share of  total produc-
tion costs, in the Florentine cloth industry, see R. GOLDTHWAITE, The Florentine Wool Industry in the 
Late Sixteenth Century: a Case Study, in “The Journal of  European Economic History”, 32, 2003, 
3, pp. 527-554. Tables 2-3, p. 537; R. DE ROOVER, A Florentine Firm, cit., Appendix IV, p. 118. 
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then organized an alliance, effectively under Venetian control, which inflicted 
a truly decisive defeat on the Turkish armada in the Gulf  of  Corinth, known 
as the Battle of  Lepanto, in October 1571, a victory that was essentially due 
to European superiority in naval artillery, and a victory that vanquished for-
ever any notions of  ‘the invincibility of  the Turks’. Indeed Ottoman naval 
power soon ‘declined rapidly’. The Ottomans, now concerned about the po-
tential dangers to their power in the Mediterranean basin, sought a new 
European alliance, one more reliable than the French had been, particularly as 
a counterweight to Venetian power.93 
The English quickly responded, for the Turks now offered them their 
very first major and most welcome opportunity to enter into and expand their 
Mediterranean trade.94 Ten years later, in 1581, the English crown authorized 
the creation of  a new overseas joint-stock trading company, by far the most 
successful one formed in the sixteenth century: the Turkey Company, reor-
ganized, in 1591, as the Levant Company. What the Turks wanted in material 
terms, apart from diplomatic support, were arms and munitions, which the 
Levant Company exported to their domains in considerable numbers.  
What the English wanted was a new and most promising outlet for their 
textiles, and access to both raw silk and spices. Initially, the woollen textiles 
that the Levant Company sold in Ottoman markets were coarse, relatively 
cheap kerseys; and their sales seem to have been not that successful, despite 
Venetian complaints about competition from lower-priced textiles. Then, 
from the 1590s, Levant Company merchants began selling larger and larger 
quantities of  the far finer and far more expensive Suffolk broadcloths, espe-
cially the Spanish Medley ‘superfines’, which soon superseded the kerseys and 
then rapidly gained a major share of  Ottoman markets, at the direct expense 
of  the Italian, French, and Dutch. Thus, from 1598 to 1634, the Company’s 
sales of  broadcloths rose from just 750 to about 17,000 pieces, while those of  
kerseys fell from 18,031 to 2,300 pieces. According to Pagano di Divitiis, in 
1634, English woollens were accounting for 40 percent of  sales in the Levan-
tine markets, while the Venetian and French shares had been reduced to 26 
                                                     
93 A.J. GRANT, History of  Europe, cit., pp. 207-225; F. BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 
615-629. 
94 Technically the first successful English maritime venture was the arrival of  the Swallow 
in the harbour of  Livorno (Leghorn) on 23 June 1573; and Livorno would continue to be very 
important for English trade in the Mediterranean. See G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, Mercanti inglesi 
nell’Italia del Seicento: Navi, traffici, egemonie, Venice 1990 (Marsilio Editore), republished as 
EaDEM, English Merchants in Seventeenth-Century Italy, trans. by Stephen Parkin, Cambridge 1997 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture), p. 5. On the 
Levant Company, see also pp. 1-35. 
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percent each, and the Dutch to just 8 percent.95 She also contends that the 
Levant Company’s chief  return cargo in return for these woollens was Asian 
silk, far and away the single most imported raw material into seventeenth-
century England, accounting for 29.5 percent of  all such imports, by value, in 
1622, 28.4 percent in 1640, 20.9 percent in 1669, and 23.4 percent in 1701.96  
One of  her most significant observations about the Levant Company’s 
trade with the Ottoman empire concerns the balance of  payments: very dif-
ferent indeed from what Ashtor had found for the Venetian Levant trade in 
the 1490s. For the Company’s payments for purchases in the Levant made in 
bullion and specie ranged from only 20 to 35 percent, almost the reverse of  
the statistics that Ashtor provided for Venice’s Levant trade in the 1490s.97 
Since then, evidently, European textile exports had diminished the relative 
need for precious metals in conducting this Levantine trade. 
One may wonder, however, why the Ottoman Empire served as such an 
important market for heavy-weight fine quality woollen cloths, such as those 
produced by both Venice and England, a commodity that was seemingly 
more suited (so to speak) for northern climates. Yet, by 1640, the Mediterra-
nean basin was accounting for 45.5 percent of  the sales of  English woollens, 
while northern Europe accounted for 46.9 percent, and the Americas for the 
remaining 7.6 percent; in the 1660s, the Mediterranean basin was now ac-
counting for over half, 56.5 precent of  the market for these woollens, while 
northern Europe accounted for only 37.6 percent.98  
The explanation for the economic importance of  the Ottoman Empire 
itself  is a combination of  population size and densities, topography, and es-
pecially climatic zones. In the later sixteenth century, the European and Asian 
portions contained at least sixteen million (Braudel), with another six million 
in Africa; and some estimates of  the aggregate Ottoman population run to 
thirty-five million (Barkan), almost half  of  Europe’s total population in 1600, 
estimated at 77.9 million.99 Equally important is the fact that much of  this 
                                                     
95 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., p. 32. She also contends that the English 
‘counterfeited the Venetian woollens stamped with the lion of  St. Mark, although they were of  
inferior quality and cost less’; but proof  is not supplied. See also R. RAPP, The Unmaking of  the 
Mediterranean Trade, cit., pp. 499-525. 
96 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., Table I.1, p. 33. 
97 Ibid., p. 25, also citing R. DAVIS, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant 
in the Eighteenth Century, London 1967, pp. 196-197. 
98 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., Table I.1, p. 34; based on C.G.A. CLAY, 
Economic Expansion and Social Change: England, 1500-1700, II, Industry, Trade, and Government, 
Cambridge-New York 1984, Table XI, p. 142. 
99 See P. EARLE, Commercial Development of  Ancona, cit., pp. 40-41; F. BRAUDEL, The Mediter-
ranean, cit., I, pp. 397-398; O.L. BARKAN, La “Mediterranée” de Fernand Braudel vue d’Istamboul, in 
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Empire then consisted of  high-plateaux lands – in the European (Ottoman) 
Balkans, in Asia Minor itself, and in neighbouring Safavid Persia – which be-
came very cold at night even in the summer months, and certainly very cold 
throughout the winter. As Ralph Davis has so eloquently commented, ‘when 
the cold gales of  autumn blew from the uplands of  Asia Minor and the Bal-
kans, the prosperous Turk or Persian counted himself  lucky to be wrapped in 
the thickest and heaviest of  English woollens’.100  
At the same time, in many warmer parts of  Mediterranean lands, the Le-
vant Company was also selling even larger quantities of  the semi-worsted or 
serge-type cloths, far lighter weight and much cheaper fabrics, which were the 
products of  the aforementioned and so-called New Draperies.101 In 1640, 
when textiles still accounted for almost all of  London’s exports, 92.3 percent 
by value, the woollens of  the Old Draperies still exceeded the value of  the 
products of  the New Draperies (bays, says, serges, perpetuanas, etc.), but not 
by much: 48.9 percent for the former vs. 43.3 percent, for the latter.102 In the 
1660s, 24.23 percent of  textiles from the New Draperies sold in the Mediter-
ranean went to Italy, 10.1 per cent to Portugal, and the largest share, 65.71 
percent to Spain (and the Spanish Americas).103 By 1700, English exports of  
cloth from the New Draperies had now increased, in absolute and relative 
terms, to account for 58.8 percent of  the total textile exports by value ( £2.82 
million); high-quality broadcloths, accounted for 25.4 percent; and the 
cheaper, coarser kerseys, dozens, and other ‘narrow’ woollens, for the remain-
ing 15.8 percent.104  
                                                                                                                         
“Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations”, 9, Jan.-March 1954, pp. 191-193; H. İNALCIK, 
Economic and Social History of  the Ottoman Empire, I, pp. 25-43: he states (p. 29) that ‘Barkan’s fig-
ures must be exaggerated’; but he does not provide an alternative estimate. See also J. DE VRIES, 
Population, in Handbook of  European History, 1400 - 1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Refor-
mation, T. BRADY, H. OBERMAN, J. TRACY eds., I-II, Leiden-New York 1994 (E.J. Brill,), I, Struc-
tures and Assertions, Table 1, p. 13 
100 R. DAVIS, England and the Mediterranean, cit., pp. 117-126 (quotation on pp. 122-123), 
contending (p. 125) that the Levant Company’s early 17th century trade was largely ‘the ex-
change of  broadcloth for raw silk’; H. VAN DER WEE, J. MUNRO, The Western European Woollen 
Industries, cit., pp. 456-461. 
101 See above, p. 934.  
102 C.G.A. CLAY, Economic Expansion, cit., Table XIII, p. 144. 
103 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., Table 5.6, p. 170. 
104 J. DE LACY MANN, The Cloth Industry in the West of  England from 1640 to 1880, Oxford 
1971, Appendix I: Table B, p. 309 (total value of  £2,818,871, excluding hosiery); H. VAN DER 
WEE, J. MUNRO, The Western European Woollen Industries, cit., Table 8.6, p. 457; C.G.A. CLAY, Eco-
nomic Expansion, cit., Table XV, p. 146, with slightly different figures, total textile exports worth 
£3,045,196, as the average of  exports in 1699-1701: 41.15% in products of  the Old Draperies; 
51.96 % in products of  the New Draperies, and 5.89% Miscellaneous (stockings, hats, others). 
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Braude’s ‘dumping thesis’ to explain the Levant Company’s success in marketing English 
woollen textiles 
Benjamin Braude has offered, however, an alternative hypothesis for the 
Levant Company’s success in marketing English woollen textiles in the Otto-
man Empire: namely, that it engaged in ‘dumping’. In other words, merchants 
of  the Levant Company were selling such woollens there for a price below 
that charged to domestic customers of  English woollen cloths.105 His thesis is 
that its merchants did so in order to gain access to an Ottoman commerce 
that would allow them to buy and import Levantine and Persian silk, which, 
as just noted from Pagano di Divitis’ research, was indeed far and away the 
Company’s most lucrative import into England. As Braude rightly notes, the 
Levant Company had a monopoly on this silk-import trade from the Levant, 
one that undoubtedly provided very high profits. But both Braude’s evidence 
and his logic for such ‘dumping’ are quite unconvincing. He compares the 
prices for English ‘cloth’ sold in both ‘London’ and Istanbul in the 1620s, us-
ing exchange rates (converting Turkish aspers into English sterling shillings) 
from the Levant Company Ledger Books.106 Even if  the exchange rates are 
accurate, these ‘prices’ still remain meaningless, unless they can be applied to 
specific types of  cloths. England, as already noted, produced a very wide 
range of  cloths, from very cheap to ultra-expensive, as did most of  its inter-
national competitors. Indeed, as also noted earlier, the organisation of  cloth 
production and textile markets for higher priced fabrics, in later medieval and 
early modern Europe, was one of  monopolistic competition, by which pro-
ducers and merchants sought to convince consumers that there were no suit-
                                                     
105 B. BRAUDE, International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500 - 1650: 
A Study in Undevelopment’, in “Review (Fernand Braudel Center)”, 2, 1979, 3, pp. 437-451. His 
contentions are repeated, but with no new evidence, in IDEM, The Rise and Fall of  Salonica Wool-
lens, 1500-1650: Technology Transfer and Western Competition, in “Mediterranean Historical Review”, 
6, 1991, pp. 216-236; reprinted in IDEM, Jews, Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean World 
after 1492, ed. A.M GINIO, London 1992, pp. 216-236, esp. pp. 228-236. In both publications, 
he also incorrectly contends that the English cloth industry had an advantage over Ottoman 
producers in its wool inputs, in that English wool prices remained stable for much of  the 17th 
century, while Turkish wool prices rose strongly. But he has confused changes in nominal 
prices with real prices, in not taking account of  the drastically inflationary debasements of  the 
Ottoman coinage in the 17th century, when England, enjoying a perfectly stable coinage, was 
experiencing deflation, from the 1640s. See S. PAMUK, Monetary History of  the Ottoman Empire, 
cit., pp. 131-48; Appendix II, pp. 235-240, especially Graph A-1, p. 236. For English prices, see 
H. PHELPS BROWN, S. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of  the Prices of  Consumables, cit., pp. 296-314. 
106 B. BRAUDE, International Competition, Tables I and II, p. 441; Tables III and IV, pp. 444-445. 
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able substitutes, in terms of  quality and price, for the specific, highly individ-
ual textile product being marketed. 
Thus we need to know what types of  cloths are represented in Braude’s 
price lists: are they Winchombe kerseys, Devonshire dozens, West Country 
broadcloths, panni di Londra, or Sussex ‘superfine Spanish medleys’?.107 We are 
given no such information, which is also lacking in his one single source, the 
well known Beveridge collection on English prices. The one series that 
Braude cites is for ‘mixed coloured’ broadcloths that Westminister Abbey 
purchased each year for its servants: generally at 13s 4d per yard, from 1613 
to 1641; and they do not appear to be actual market prices.108 At these prices, 
these woollens were certainly in the luxury category. Their purchase, in the 
1620s, would have cost a master mason (Oxford-Cambridge) more than two 
weeks’ wages per yard; and for a complete broadcloth of  24 yards, that ma-
son would have had to spend 320 days’ wages, well more than a year’s annual 
wage income (at 210 days’ employment).109 Braude does not, however, cite 
another of  Beveridge’s cloth price series: for broadcloths purchased for 
Westminister scholars.110 They were far cheaper, averaging only 7s 4d per yard 
(only 55 percent as much) during these same years. From Beveridge’s raw data 
and other sources, Phelps Brown and Hopkins have presented prices for 
other woollens, purchased for servants and scholars at Winchester and Eton 
Colleges, which, for the period 1615-40, averaged just 5s 0d and 6s 6d per 
yard, respectively.111 Thus Braude’s citation of  one single price series for un-
usually expensive woollens (at Westminster) cannot possibly justify his charge 
that the Levant Company was ‘dumping’ woollens in Ottoman markets; nor is 
there any other evidence to make that case, which, to repeat, would require a 
comparison of  English and Turkish prices for very similar if  not identical 
fabrics, in the same years. 
                                                     
107 See, for example, the text in n. 83, above. 
108 W. BEVERIDGE, Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century, I: Price 
Tables: Mercantile Era, London 1939 (Longman Green) reissued London:1965 (Frank Cass and 
Co, Ltd.), p. 183- 
109 The daily wage for master masons in Oxford and Cambridge was then 12d sterling 
(1s). H. PHELPS BROWN, S. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of  Building Wages, in “Economica”, 22, 87, 
1955, pp. 195-206; reprinted in H. PHELPS BROWN, S. HOPKINS, A Perspective of  Wages and Prices, 
London 1981, pp. 1-12. 
110 W. BEVERIDGE, Prices and Wages, p. 193. 
111 Archives of  the British Library of  Economic and Political Science: Phelps Brown Papers. 
A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH 949
In any event, why, from the forgoing analysis, would the Levant Company 
have needed or wanted to engage in ‘dumping’, i.e., in presumably selling such 
cloths at a loss? For there is no evidence that that mutually harmful technique 
was in any way necessary to gain access to Ottoman trade. Furthermore, any 
such ‘dumping’ would have reduced the sales revenues and net incomes nec-
essary to purchase the silks and spices – even if  unquestionably that import 
trade was more profitable than the export trade to the Ottoman Empire. In 
other words, why would the Levant Company have adopted a strategy that 
required the export of  even more specie, especially when such exports (with-
out a costly licence) was still illegal.112 
 
English naval power and Mediterranean commerce 
The other advantage that allowed the English to gain commercial su-
premacy in Ottoman and other Mediterranean markets by the later seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was a decisively superior and also lower cost 
naval technology. As Ralph Davis has demonstrated, the English were now 
building and operating far larger, far stronger oak-based carracks, which were 
also more heavily gunned (with ranks of  up to 60 powerful cannons) than 
were those of  any of  their rivals. Both pirates and Muslim corsairs – which 
had so menaced the Mediterranean shipping lanes – learned at their very 
painful cost to stay away from the English galleons. To be sure the operating 
costs were considerably higher than those for rival ships (about ten percent), 
but the insurance rates were correspondingly much lower. The greater cer-
tainty that cargoes would safely and speedily reach their destinations was cer-
tainly also a very powerful advantage. All such factors help explain why the 
English gained, as well, such a large share of  the Mediterranean ‘carrying’ 
trades.113 It is indeed significant to note that the total tonnage of  the English 
                                                     
112 From January 1364, Statute 36 Edwardi III, stat. 1, c. 2 had forbidden the export of  
any English coin (without a royal licence) as well as all forms of  bullion: in  Statutes of  the 
Realm, I, p. 383.  In May 1663,  Parliament repealed its provisions concerning bullion exports: 
in Statute 15 Carolus II,  c. 7, in Statutes of  the Realm, V, p.  451, sec. 9. That legislation was 
influenced by arguments  set forth by the East India Company: in  THOMAS MUN, England's 
Treasure by Forraign Trade [1664] (reissued Oxford 1937). 
113 R. DAVIS, England and the Mediterranean, cit., pp. 126-137. See also IDEM, English Overseas 
Trade, 1500 – 1700, London 1973, pp. 20-31; IDEM, The Rise of  the English Shipping Industry, cit., 
pp. 1-57, 228-256; G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., pp. 41-55; see in particular, p. 
43: ‘While Holland was pre-eminent in the development of  merchant shipping, England outdid 
all other countries in the design of  warships’. 
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merchant fleet rose from just 50,000 tons in 1572 to 340,00 tons in 1686.114 
At the same time, as several historians have argued, and most recently and 
most eloquently Pagano di Divitiis, the Venetian and other Italian (and also 
Spanish) ship-building industries were experiencing a veritable ‘crisis’ from 
the 1570s, especially in constructing larger vessels, from soaring costs that 
primarily reflected a scarcity of  suitable ship timbers in the Mediterranean 
zone, compared to the very abundant and low cost supply available in the 
Baltic zone, but even within England itself; and for the Italians to import 
northern timber or to buy northern-built ships, though an obvious and in-
creasingly used alternative, was still relatively costly in terms of  transport and 
transaction costs.115  
 
The Dutch and English East India Companies, the spice trade, and the decline of  Venice 
in the seventeenth century 
Finally, the rapid seventeenth-century decline of  the Venetian cloth in-
dustry may also be related to adverse developments in the spice trade, which 
certainly had a very major impact on the overall decline of  Venetian com-
merce in the seventeenth century. The Levant Company, in trading with the 
Ottoman Levant, was also anxious to secure some access (via Aleppo) to that 
spice trade; and some its key merchants and investors were responsible for 
the establishment of  by far the most powerful of  the new overseas joint-
stock trading companies: the East India Company, chartered in 1600, with a 
monopoly on English trade with the Indian Ocean basin. At almost the same 
time, the Dutch formed the Vereinige Oost-Indisch Compagnie (United East 
India Co: VOC), for the same purpose. Taking advantage of  disruptions in the 
European spice trade in the 1590s, this time involving both the Portuguese and 
the Venetians, the Dutch and English rivals engaged in a race to establish a di-
rect sea route to the Indies (and to India itself). The two, but most especially 
the Dutch Company, not only destroyed much (if  not all) of  the remaining 
Portuguese commercial power in the Indies, but succeeded where the Portu-
guese had failed: in securing an almost complete monopsony over the East In-
dies spice trade. Though the Dutch, in the 1622 ‘Massacre of  Amboyna’, 
evicted the English from the East Indies, the latter came to benefit more by 
concentrating their energies on securing control over the commerce of  India 
itself. Certainly Venetian commercial power in the spice trade rapidly dwindled. 
                                                     
114 Ibid., Table 2.1, p. 43; R. DAVIS, The Rise of  the English Shipping Industry, cit., pp. 7, 10, 15. 
115 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., pp. 36-46, and the many secondary 
sources cited here. 
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The loss of  that power, in buying spices via Ottoman ports, may have also con-
tributed to the decline in their woollen sales in the Ottoman Empire – though 
the other factors just cited may have been more important. 
 
Conclusions on Bullion Flows and Europe’s Balance of  Payments with the Islamic World. 
That export trade of  the two East India Companies in the Indian Ocean 
basin involved a vast expansion in silver shipments. From 1660 to 1720, their 
combined export was 3,437,557.2 kg of  silver; and for the English East India 
Company itself, during these six decades, silver accounted for 81.35 percent 
of  the precious metals shipped to India; and ‘treasure’ accounted for 78.94 
per cent and thus merchandise sales accounted for only 21.06 percent of  the 
value of  the Company’s imports from Asia into Europe. (Tables 6-8)116 That 
represents a far greater ‘deficit’ in Europe’s balance of  payments in this re-
gion, compared to both the Venetian and then English trade in the Levant, 
and with the Ottoman Empire generally – where of  course textiles played a 
far greater role (and thus diminishing the relative role of  precious metals) 
than they could possibly have done in the Indian Ocean basin. 
But once, more such silver shipments posed no serious problems for the 
European economy, since the influx of  silver from the Spanish American 
mines generally exceeded the outflow. And if  that silver surplus was diminish-
ing in the later seventeenth century it was soon replenished, from the early 
eighteenth century, by new silver mining booms in Mexico.117 From the per-
                                                     
116 F.S. GAASTRA, The Exports of  Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India 
Company, 1602-1795 A.D., in Precious Metals in the Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICH-
ARDS, Durham N.C. 1983, pp. 447-476; K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances: the East 
India Company's Export Trade, 1660-1720, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 21, 1968, pp. 
480-502, Table 1, pp. 497-498. In the English East India Company’s early history, however, 
from 1601 to 1624, it exported a total of  £753,336 in precious metals (‘treasure’) and £351,236 
in merchandise, for an aggregate export value of  £1,104,572, so that precious metals then 
accounted for a somewhat lower percentage of  the total value:  68.20%.  IDEM, The East India 
Company and the Export of  Treasure in the Early Seventeenth Century, in “Economic History 
Review”, 2nd ser., 16, 1, 1963, p. 24. 
117 P. BAKEWELL, Mining in Colonial Spanish America, in The Cambridge History of  Latin Amer-
ica, 2, Colonial Latin America, ed. L. BETHELL, Cambridge-New York 1984 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press), pp. 105-151; P. BAKEWELL, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546 
– 1700, Cambridge 1971; H.E. CROSS, South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750, 
in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS , Durham N.C. 
1983, pp. 425-439; R.L. GARNER, Long-term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative 
Analysis of  Peru and Mexico, in “American Historical Review”, 67, 1987, 3, pp. 405-430; D.A. 
BRADING, Mexican Silver Mining in the Eighteenth Century: the Revival of  Zacatecas, in “Hispanic 
American Historical Review”, 50, 1970, 4, pp. 665-681. 
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spective of  four centuries of  economic history, we may observe that, in ex-
porting so much ‘treasure’, silver especially, to the Levant and Asia – most of  
which was in the Islamic world — the Venetians, the Portuguese, the English, 
the Dutch (and other Europeans) promoted the growth of  the European and 
indeed the global economy, through the enormous expansion in trade that 
such precious metals generated. The fact that so much of  these precious-
metal exports took place during the inflationary Price Revolution era and the 
fact that the bimetallic ratio had risen (in England) from 10.33:1 in 1464 to 
14.485 in 1660 together prove that western Europe, despite such exports, had 
long enjoyed a surplus of  silver.118  
                                                     
118 My own calculations of  the official bimetallic mint ratios indicate a rise from 12.109 in 
1604 to 13.363 in 1612 to 13.348 in 1623 to 14.485 in 1660 to 15.210 in 1718 (remaining at this 
level until 1815). Based on data supplied in CH. CHALLIS, Appendix I: Mint Output, 1220-1985, in 
A New History of  the Royal Mint, ed. IDEM, Cambridge 1992, pp. 673-698. 
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Table 5. Venetian Woollen Cloth Production, 1516-1723, in quinquennial means 
 
Years  Cloth  Years  Cloth 
  Outputs    Outputs 
       
1516-20  2,416.60  1621-25  15,659.40
     
1521-25  3,647.80  1626-30  16,818.40
     
1526-30  4,593.80  1631-35  12,340.20
     
1531-35  5,492.20  1636-40  12,393.40
     
1536-40  5,078.40  1641-45  12,780.40
     
1541-45  7,891.40  1646-50  9,810.00
     
1546-50  10,151.60  1651-55  10,696.00
     
1551-55  11,547.80  1656-60  8,567.20
     
1556-60  16,131.60  1661-65  7,966.40
     
1561-65  16,075.80  1666-70  6,464.00
     
1566-70  18,513.20  1671-75  6,493.20
     
1571-75  17,512.20  1676-80  4,069.40
     
1576-80  17,986.00  1681-85  3,673.80
     
1581-85  19,709.40  1686-90  2,058.20
     
1586-90  19,093.20  1691-95  2,863.00
       
1591-95  23,393.00  1696-00  2,426.40  
      
1596-00  21,567.20  1701-05  2,453.80  
      
1601-05  23,572.80  1706-10  2,132.20  
      
1606-10  18,535.40  1711-15  2,019.00  
      
1611-15  17,917.40  1716-20  2,141.00  
      
1616-20  19,682.80  1721-23  1822.33  
 
Sources: 
W. PANCIERA, L’Arte matrice, cit., Table 2, pp. 42-43, which also extends the series from 1713 to 
1723. I wish to offer my sincere thanks to Professor Panciera, who sent me a photo-copy of  
the document from the Venetian archives (ASCW, Cinque savi b. 476) containing the original 
data. His table corrects many errors that had been reproduced in the much better know series 
of  statistics on Venetian woollen cloth production, in D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the Venetian 
Woollen Industry, cit. Unfortunately, I found it necessary to correct his statistics, from the origi-
nal archival document, for the following four years: 1521, 1618, 1639, 1662. 
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Table 6 . Exports of  Silver to Asia by the Dutch and English East India Companies, 
in kilograms of  fine silver, in decennial means, 1660-69 to 1710-19 
 
 
Decade Dutch East British East Total Silver 
 India Co. India Co. Shipments 
 kg of  silver kg of  silver kg of  silver 
    
1660-69 11,563.1 5,729.6 17,292.7 
    
1670-79 11,854.6 11,364.0 23,218.6 
    
1680-89 18,847.0 29,276.0 48,123.0 
    
1690-99 27,720.9 18,179.0 45,899.9 
    
1700-09 37,392.9 36,294.3 73,687.2 
    
1710-19 37,108.1 41,133.6 78241.7 
Sources: F.S. GAASTRA, The Exports of  Precious Metal, cit., pp. 447-476; K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treas-
ure and Trade Balances, cit., pp. 497-498. 
 
 
Table 7 . Export Statistics of  the English East India Company: Exports  
of  Precious Metals in kilograms and Pounds Sterling of  England,  
in decennial means: 1660-69 to 1710-19 
 
 
Decades Silver kg Silver value Gold kg Gold Value Total Treasure Silver Gold as
  in £ sterling  in £ sterling in £ sterling as percentpercent
        
1660-69 5,729.600 51,445.568 175.140 22,576.832 74,022.400 69.50% 30.50%
  
1670-79 11,364.000 102,063.8501,015.300 132,027.550 234,091.400 43.60% 56.40%
  
1680-89 29,276.000 262,839.775 929.070 120,867.926 383,707.700 68.50% 31.50%
  
1690-99 18,179.000 163,230.172 24.690 3,331.228 166,561.400 98.00% 2.00%
  
1700-09 36,294.300 325,887.606 79.540 11,121.294 337,008.900 96.70% 3.30%
  
1710-19 41,133.600 369,189.591 14.970 2,228.509 371,418.100 99.40% 0.60%
  
  
TOTAL 141,976.5001,274,656.5632,238.710 292,153.337 1,566,809.900 81.35% 18.65%
 
Source: K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances, cit., Table 1, pp. 497-498. 
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Table 8. The English East India Company's Export Trade to India in Treasure and 
Merchandise 
in pounds sterling: in decennial means, 1660-69 to 1710-19 
      
Decades Total Treasure Merchandise Total Value Treasure Merchandise
 in £ sterling in £ sterling in £ sterling percent Percent 
      
1660-69 74,022.400 41,085.200 115,107.600 64.31% 35.69% 
     
1670-79 234,091.400 89,990.800 324,082.200 72.23% 27.77% 
     
1680-89 383,707.700 56,170.200 439,877.900 87.23% 12.77% 
     
1690-99 166,561.400 72,065.200 238,626.600 69.80% 30.20% 
     
1700-09 337,008.900 60,876.500 397,885.400 84.70% 15.30% 
     
1710-19 371,418.100 97,771.300 469,189.400 79.16% 20.84% 
     
     
 
Source: Calculated from: K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances, cit., Table 1, pp. 497-
498. 
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